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1 - Abstract 
 
 
The current document will have the aim to analyze study and understand the latest 
amendments to the ATA Directive, European Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 
2016, laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of 
the internal market. These latest amendments were introduced in January 2019 with the new 
European Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017 (so-called ATAD 2), which 
innovated the 2016/1164 Directive. Since the focus of this amendment is the hybrid 
mismatches and the rules to avoid them, I have made up my mind and decided of going into 
deep of this matter, and study them. 
 
I have decided to study the phenomenon of hybrid mismatch because I was fascinated by the 
issue of tax avoidance practiced by large multinational companies that operate, above all, in 
countries with privileged taxation. This topic, of extreme interest nowadays, presents facets 
that have attracted me and led me to analyze the phenomenon more closely and more 
precisely. 
I believe that the subject dealt in this thesis goes promptly to describe the concept of tax 
avoidance and hybrid mismatches which, until now, has always been considered a subject of 
secondary importance. With a brief but timely study of mine, I will try to highlight the 
discipline of tax avoidance, focusing on Hybrid Mismatches expressed in the new ATAD 2 
directive, in the new Legislative Decree, and in the OECD BEPS Action 2. 
  
I will start with a short description of the BEPS Package and the OECD Actions, continuing 
with the history of BEPS in the first part and the analysis of the OECD Action 2. Then a 
center of attention will be on the main differences of Hybrid mismatches through the ATAD 
Directive.  
 
The focus, then, will be on the concept of Hybrid Mismatches analyzed with ATAD 2 
European Council Directive and the Legislative Decree November 29th 2018 n. 142. A deep 
description and analysis will be given in the central part of the thesis.  Already in the ATAD 1 
Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016, there was a reference (see Article 9 1 of 
                                                 
1 European Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016, Art. 9, Hybrid Mismatches: “To the extent that a hybrid 
mismatch results in a double deduction, the deduction shall be given only in the Member State where such 
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the same directive) to these practices, but there had been no solutions nor precise explanations 
that can deal with the above actions. With the drafting and approval of the new ATAD 2 
Directive and precisely with the publication of BEPS Action 2, OECD wanted to put an end 
to these erosive and evasive practices. 
 
The intention, therefore, will be to analyze the changes related to the treatment of hybrid 
mismatches and to understand why some of their elements and instruments (such as a 
particular type of hybrid instruments) are not present or not fully studied in the European 
Directive and in the Legislative Decree November 29th n. 142. This topic, now more than 
ever, is highly critical as this harmful practice has been used mostly by large multinationals to 
profit off taxes paid in countries with privileged taxation.  
 
During the analysis of the European Council Directive and the Legislative Decree, I discover 
that there is no presence of a critical type of financial hybrid instrument. This instrument is 
the substitute payment. It is, instead, well discussed in the OECD Action 2 2015 Final Report 
and in the 2017 report. The question that I posed and to which I will try to give an answer at 
the end of my thesis is: why these instruments are not discussed and reported in the European 
Directive and in the Italian Legislation? What was the reasons why this element decided not 
to be implemented in the European Union soil?  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
payment has its source. To the extent that a hybrid mismatch results in a deduction without inclusion, the 
Member State of the payer shall deny the deduction of such payment”. 
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2. Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) 
 
 
From the seminal work posed by the League of Nations in the 1902s2, the structure of the tax 
principles that we know today has grown. These are briefly the principles: residence taxation, 
permanent establishments, reduced source taxation, credit and exemption methods for relief of 
still existing double taxation, and the like. In 1998, the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) 3 released a report on harmful tax competition that 
signaled an important change of focus in international cooperation efforts. The report directly 
or indirectly raised three distinct problems related to double non-taxation:  
- tax evasion; 
- tax avoidance;  
- tax subsidies and ‘‘substantive’’ tax competition. 
On the second strand of the 1998 report, it appeared that the time has come for greater 
international cooperation in the area of tax avoidance in the form of the OECD’s Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project. 4 
There are three distinct, and yes interdependable, core principles established by the BEPS 
project and considered fundamental for international tax reform:  
- the necessity of establishing the international tax regime on a collaborative-based 
paradigm rather than on a competition-based paradigm;  
- the importance of taking a systematic or holistic approach to substantive international 
tax reform rather than an ad-hoc approach and acknowledging the interdependence of 
the norms of the international tax regime; 
- the inevitability of accepting completely new solutions to problems that could not be 
resolved by the applicable norms, contrary to the traditional conservatism of the 
international tax regime. 5  
Coming to present days, the international tax landscape has changed dramatically in recent 
years. With political support of G20 Leaders, the international community has taken joint 
                                                 
2 The League of Nations was an international diplomatic group developed after World War I as a way to solve 
disputes between countries before they erupted into open warfare. A precursor to the United Nations, the League 
achieved some victories but had a mixed record of success, sometimes putting self-interest before becoming 
involved with conflict resolution, while also contending with governments that did not recognize its authority. 
The League effectively ceased operations during World War II.  
 
3 OECD, Background Brief, Inclusive Framework on BEPS, January 2017. 
 
4 H.J. Ault, “Some Reflections on the OECD and the Sources of International Tax Principles” in Tax Notes 
International Vol.70/12 del 17 Giugno 2013, pags. 1195-1196. 
 
5 Y. Brauner, “What the BEPS?” in Florida Tax Review Vol. 16/2014 Fasc. 2, pagg 58-59. 
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action to increase transparency and exchange of information in tax matters, and to address 
weaknesses of the international tax system that create opportunities for BEPS project. 6 The 
OECD, personifying the role of BEPS’ project manager, has engaged in the creation of the 
Actions not only the representatives of different Member States, but also public opinion and 
economic operators that have actively intervened in the discussion of the drafts gradually 
presented by the OECD. On numerous occasions, in fact, the input of the stakeholders has 
been of considerable importance especially in light of the pressing pace of the BEPS Project. 7 
The internationally agreed standards of transparency and exchange of information in the tax 
area have put an end to the era of bank secrecy. 8 With over 130 countries and jurisdictions 
currently participating, the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for 
Tax Purposes has ensured consistent and effective implementation of international 
transparency standards since its establishment in 2009. 
At the same time, the financial crisis and aggressive tax planning by multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) have put BEPS high on the political agenda. 9 In fact, the definitive thrust towards 
the creation of a comprehensive and holistic program, like the BEPS project, derives from the 
outbreak of the 2007 economic crisis. It had the foreseeable consequence of shaking the 
minds of public opinion by providing a perception of urgency to the BEPS project and a 
notable political visibility on the failures of the rules on the taxation of multinational 
companies that have not been able to adapt to the reality of modern economic-financial 
contexts. 10 
With a conservatively estimated annual revenue loss of USD 100 to 240 billion, the stakes are 
high for governments around the world. The impact of BEPS on developing countries, as a 
percentage of tax revenues, is estimated to be even higher than in developed countries. 
In September 2013, the G20 Leaders endorsed the ambitious and comprehensive BEPS 
Action Plan, 11 developed with OECD members. 12 Based on this Action Plan, the OECD and 
                                                 
6 Background Brief, Inclusive framework of BEPS, OECD, January 2017. 
 
7 P. Saint-Amans, R. Russo, “The BEPS Package: Promise Kept” in Bulletin for International Taxation, Vol. 
70/2016 Fasc. 4, pag 236. 
 
8 Background brief, Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD January 2017. 
 
9 Ibidem. 
 
10 H.J. Ault, W. Schon, S.E. Shay, “Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: a roadmap for reforms” in Bulletin for 
International Taxation , Volume 68/2014 n.6/7 pag 275 e ss. 
 
11 Self, H., Addressing base erosion and profit shifting, British tax review. - London. - (2013), no. 2 ; p. 117-122, 
2013; 
 
12 Background Brief, Inclusive framework of BEPS, OECD, January 2017. 
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G20 countries developed and agreed, on an equal footing, upon a comprehensive package of 
measures, in just two years. These measures were designed to be implemented domestically 
and through tax treaty provisions in a coordinated manner, supported by targeted monitoring 
and strengthened transparency. The concept of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting is also 
well studied by the Self H.13 with a particular focus on the British situation.  
This project however was not accepted and well-liked by all the countries. The main reason 
was attributable to the Organization itself that has shown an ambivalence behavior about its 
caretaker role. On one hand, the OECD has worked on increasing its power and influence 
worldwide, primarily through the promotion of standardization and convergence and, on the 
other hand, it has always been and has viewed itself as the representative of the interests of its 
members club of the rich countries. Consequently, it perhaps viewed itself unauthorized to 
consider interests of other countries, at least to the extent they conflict with its members' 
interests. 14 
To summarize, the BEPS project refers to tax planning strategies that exploit gaps and 
mismatches in tax rules to shift “artificial” profits to low or no-tax locations where there is 
little or no economic activity. Although some of the schemes used are illegal, most of them 
are not. This undermines the fairness and integrity of tax systems because businesses that 
operate across borders can use BEPS to gain a competitive advantage over enterprises that 
operate at a domestic level.  Moreover, when the taxpayers see multinational corporations 
legally avoiding income tax, undermine voluntary compliance by all taxpayers. 15 Some 
scholars however do not blame only multinational corporations. As example A. Contrino in 
his work 16 explains how the scope of a multinational company should not be considered only 
the temptation of minimizing the tax burden, but it should focus his attention detecting if 
these “illegally” operations are set with the only aim of relieving the fiscal burden on the 
holdings. 
2.1 - About BEPS Package 
 
 
The BEPS package consists of reports on 15 actions, and sets out a variety of measures 
ranging from new minimum standards to the revision of existing standards. In particular, four 
                                                 
13 OECD, Background Brief, Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD January 2017. 
 
14 Y. Brauner, “What the BEPS?” in Florida Tax Review Vol. 16/2014 Fasc. 2, pag. 62. 
 
15 www.oecd.org 
 
16 A. Contrino, “BEPS: Is International Tax Planning Over?” in Tax Notes International, Vol. 75/2014 n. 10, 
pag. 842 
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minimum standards were agreed to tackle issues in cases no action by some countries or 
jurisdictions would have created negative spillovers (including adverse impacts of 
competitiveness) on others. Their consistent implementation will allow countries to protect 
their taxable base. 17 
Existing standards have also been updated and will be implemented, noting however that not 
all countries, which have participated in the BEPS Project, have endorsed the underlying 
standards on tax treaties or transfer pricing. 18 
In other areas, such as recommendations on hybrid mismatch arrangements and best practices 
on interest deductibility, countries and jurisdictions have agreed on a general tax policy 
direction. In these areas, domestic rules are expected to converge through the implementation 
of the common approaches, thereby still enabling further consideration of whether such 
measures should become minimum standards. Guidance based on best practices will also 
support governments intending to act in the areas of mandatory disclosure initiatives or 
controlled foreign company (CFC) legislation. 19 
The BEPS package was agreed and delivered by OECD members and by G20 economies, and 
subsequently endorsed by the G20 Leaders Summit in Antalya on 15-16 November 2015. 20 
Even though some elements of the BEPS Action Plan are still being finalized, the main tasks 
relate now to the implementation of the agreed package.  
Effective and consistent implementation of the BEPS package requires an inclusive 
implementation process. First, the implementation of the BEPS package into different tax 
systems should not result in conflicts between domestic systems. 21 Furthermore, the 
interpretation of the new standards should not lead to increased disputes. Finally, it is 
necessary to ensure a leveled playing field among countries and jurisdictions in the fight 
against tax avoidance. 
Jurisdictions identified as relevant to the work of the Global Forum on Transparency and 
Information Exchange for Tax Purposes (Global Forum) have already been subject to 
monitoring and peer review of the implementation of the Global Forum’s standards on 
                                                 
17 Background brief, Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD January 2017. 
 
18 Ibidem. 
 
19 Ibidem. 
 
20 See also reference Bloomberg, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) final Action Plan: a collection of in-
depth analysis and insight, 2015.  
 
21 Background brief, Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD January 2017. 
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transparency and the exchange of information for tax purposes. A similar process is being 
developed for the implementation of the BEPS package. 22 
 
2.2 - OECD Actions 
 
 
A brief insight of the BEPS package is listed below and it consists of 13 Actions. The 
recommendations take the form of new minimum standards, common approaches and 
guidance. 23,24 
 
Fig. 1: OECD Action Item of BEPS Project 25 
 
Action 1 
Addresses the tax challenges of the digital economy and identifies the main difficulties that 
the digital economy poses for the application of existing international tax rules. The Report 
                                                 
22 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Action 2, 2015 Final Report, Summaries of the Report; 
 
23 Svasti-Salee, J, Around the world in 13 reports, Tax adviser. - Sutton. - (March 2016) ; p. 30-33, 2016. 
 
24 For a deep dive analyses on the OECD Actions there are studies in which different classifications are 
discussed by several scholars. Of great importance the work of Y. Brauner, “What the BEPS?” in Florida Tax 
Review, Vol. 16/2014 Fasc. 2, pag. 69. 
 
25 Melinda Brown Presentation, OECD Senior Transfer Pricing Advisor, discussed on Mazars International Tax 
Conference in London on October 13th 2016. 
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develops detailed options to address these difficulties, taking a holistic approach and 
considering both direct and indirect taxation. 26 On this Action in particular D. Spencer, by 
detecting the pillars of BEPS project, focuses his attention on the increasing importance on 
intangible assets as source of income. 27 
 
Action 2 
 By neutralizing the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements, Action 2 develops model treaty 
provisions and recommendations regarding the design of domestic rules to eliminate the effect 
(e.g. double non-taxation, double deduction, long-term deferral) of hybrid instruments and 
entities. 28 
 
Action 3 
This Action, by strengthening the rules for controlled foreign corporations, develops 
recommendations regarding the design of controlled foreign company rules. 29 This is indeed 
an important component of the anti-BEPS initiative. The reform of anti-deferral regimes, such 
as CFC rules, supposedly makes sense within the project. 30 The work of the OECD is to 
make a worldwide effort to create harmonization between different jurisdictions. With the 
CFC rule, OECD wants to create a new international system in which each State, for the sake 
of common international taxation, actively participates in designing, implementing and 
obeying similar CFC rules. 31 
 
Action 4 
The action, by limiting base erosion via interest deductions and other financial payments, 
develops recommendations regarding best practices in the design of rules to prevent base 
erosion through the use of interest expenses. 32 For example, with related-party and third party 
                                                 
26 Background brief, Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD January 2017. 
 
27 For further analysis refers to D. Spencer, “OECD BEPS Project: Transfer Pricing (Part 1)” in Journal of 
International Taxation, Vol. 11/2013 pag. 25. 
 
28 Background brief, Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD January 2017. 
 
29 Ibidem. 
 
30 Y. Brauner, “What the BEPS?” in Florida Tax Review, Vol. 16/2014 Fasc. 2 pag. 85. 
 
31 R. Robillard, “BEPS Action 3 Missing in Action: CFC Rules or Global Apportionment?” in Tax Management 
Transfer Pricing Report, Vol. 24/2015, n. 3, pag. 2. 
 
32 OECD/G20, Action 5, Harmful Tax Practices. 
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debt, it achieves excessive interest deductions or finances the production of exempt or 
deferred income, and other financial payments that are economically equivalent to interest 
payments. This action item, besides taking a conservative approach lending to perfection of 
best practices at the domestic level, it seems that in this context such best practices must 
include actual solution on which countries would be expected to converge. 33 
 
Action 5 
Studies how to counter harmful tax practices 34 more effectively and, by taking into account 
transparency and substance, revamps the work on harmful tax practices with a priority on 
improving transparency, including compulsory spontaneous exchange on rulings related to 
preferential regimes, and on requiring substantial activity for any preferential regime. 35 It is 
clear therefore that the main outcome of this action is to ensure the integrity of tax regimes by 
addressing the problems caused by favorable regulations that apply to dynamic activities and 
which unjustly erode the tax base of other countries by distorting the allocation of capital. 36 
 
Action 6 
This work, by preventing treaty abuse or “treaty shopping”, develops model treaty provisions 
and recommendations regarding the design of domestic rules to prevent the granting of treaty 
benefits in inappropriate circumstances. 37 The concept of treaty shopping refers to techniques 
that consist in the use of the Conventions against double taxation in order to gain further 
advantages from a fiscal point of view. 38 
 
Action 7 
Develops changes to the definition of permanent establishment to prevent the artificial 
avoidance of permanent establishment status in relation to BEPS, including the use of 
                                                 
33 Y. Brauner, “What the BEPS?” in Florida Tax Review, Vol. 16/2014 Fasc. 2 pag. 90. 
 
34 For better comprehension see real life case analyzed in V. Ting, “iTax - Apple's Internatinal Tax Structure and 
the Double Non-Taxation Issue”, in British Tax Review, n. 1, 2014. 
 
35 Background brief, Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD January 2017. 
 
36 OECD, “Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into Account Transparency and 
Substance, Action 5: 2015 Final Report”, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD 
Publishing, Paris 2015 
 
37 Background brief, Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD January 2017. 
 
38 P. Valente, I. Caraccioli, “Treaty shopping e beneficiario effettivo: profili penal-tributari” in Il fisco 10/2016 
pag 935 
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commissionaire arrangements, the specific activity exemptions and the reform of the 
international tax regime rules applicable to business income. 39 These rules provide that only 
meaningful presence of business conducted by a non-resident would trigger taxation by the 
source country where the business is conducted. This is why those rules establishes a PE 
threshold to determine the instance when business would be considered meaningful enough to 
trigger taxation. 40 
 
Action 8 – 10 
Aggressive transfer pricing is the beating heart of BEPS planning, the sine qua non of the 
transactions that triggered the universal interest in BEPS and eventually the BEPS project. 41 
Thus, Actions 8-10 work to assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value 
creation including work on: 
- intangibles by developing rules to prevent BEPS from moving intangibles among 
group members; 
- risks and capital by developing rules to prevent BEPS from transferring risks among, 
or allocating excessive capital to, group members;  
- other high-risk transactions that develop rules to prevent BEPS from engaging in 
transactions which would not, or would only very rarely, occur between third-parties. 
42 
 
Action 11. 
By establishing methodologies to collect and analyzing data on BEPS and the actions to 
address it, develops recommendations regarding indicators of the scale and economic impact 
of BEPS and ensures that tools are available to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness and 
economic impact of the actions taken to address BEPS on an ongoing basis. 43 This 
continuous evolution requires constant monitoring 44 on BEPS project.  
                                                 
39 Background brief, Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD January 2017. 
 
40 Y. Brauner, “What the BEPS?” in Florida Tax Review, Vol. 16/2014 Fasc. 2, pag 94. 
 
41 Y. Brauner, “What the BEPS?” in Florida Tax Review, Vol. 16/2014 Fasc. 2, pag 96. 
 
42 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Action 2, 2015 Final Report, Summaries of the Report, 
Annex 1 – Overview of the BEPS Packages; 
 
43 Background brief, Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD January 2017. 
 
44 P. Valente, “Erosione della base imponibile e “profit shifting”: “focus” sugli aggiornamenti dell’OECD” in 
Corriere Tributario 41/2014, pag. 3180; 
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Action 12 
This action, by requiring taxpayers to disclose their aggressive tax planning arrangements, 
develops recommendations regarding the design of mandatory disclosure rules for aggressive 
or abusive transactions, arrangements, or structures. 45 It is essential that the rules on 
mandatory disclosure take into account the balance between additional compliance costs for 
businesses and benefit in terms of more information and timeliness of information obtained 
from financial administrations. 46 
 
Action 13 
Re-examining transfer pricing, Action 13, by taking into consideration the compliance costs 
for business, develops rules on transfer pricing documentation to increase transparency for tax 
administrations. 47 Two important […] key deliverables of Action item 13 in the tax 
community are  
- the standardization of a core of transfer pricing-related information reporting  
- the mandate of country-by-country reporting of MNE operations. 48 
 
Action 14 
Develops solutions to address obstacles that prevent countries from solving treaty-related 
disputes under mutual agreement procedures (MAP) 49, including the absence of arbitration 
provisions in most treaties and the fact that the access to MAP and arbitration may be denied 
in certain cases. 50 
 
Action 15 
                                                 
45 Background brief, Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD January 2017. 
 
46 C.HJI Panay, “Advanced issues in international and European tax law”, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015, 
pag.135 
 
47 Background brief, Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD January 2017. 
 
48 Y. Brauner, “What the BEPS?” in Florida Tax Review, Vol. 16/2014 Fasc. 2, pag. 104; 
 
49 Secondo la circolare n.21/E del 5 Giugno 2012 le procedure amichevoli (MAP) sono “lo strumento per la 
risoluzione delle controversie internazionali, nelle situazioni in cui un soggetto residente di uno dei due Stati 
contraenti ritenga che le misure adottate da una o entrambe le Amministrazioni finanziarie comportano o 
comporteranno nei suoi confronti un'imposizione non conforme alle disposizioni della Convenzione”. 
 
50 OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, July 2013. 
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By developing a multilateral instrument with the aim of modifying bilateral tax treaties, 
Action 15 provides an analysis of the issues of tax and public international law related to the 
development of a multilateral instrument by enabling countries to implement measures 
developed in the course of the work of BEPS and amend bilateral tax treaties. 51 
 
It is of critical importance that these recommendations, described here on the matter of the 
BEPS project, will allow to reach out a contact point between the need of the multinational 
companies to legally reduce their fiscal burden and the necessity of the tax administration to 
avoid the loss of the tax base caused by the aggressive tax planning. 52 
 
2.3 - Action 2: Neutralizing the effects of Hybrid Mismatches Arrangements 
 
 
For the purpose of this thesis it is necessary to focus on the Action 253. As said in the previous 
paragraph Action 2 develops model treaty provisions and recommendations regarding the 
design of domestic rules to neutralize the effect of hybrid instruments and entities (e.g. double 
non-taxation, double deduction, and long-term deferral). 54 In particular, the work of the 
scholar Peterson J. on the Action 2 is critical. 55  
 
The OECD G20 BEPS project calls for an end of hybrid financial instruments that make 
taxable income disappear. For example, Company A base in a European Country, makes a 
payment to company B, a related firm based outside Europe. The transaction is packed as a 
complex financial instrument: a convertible bond. Under the jurisdiction of Country A, the 
payment is treated as interest and deductible for tax purposes. Instead, under the jurisdiction 
of Country B, the payment is treated as a dividend and benefits from a tax exemption. The 
result is a deduction in the jurisdiction of Country A without taxation in the jurisdiction in 
Country B. So what is the solution to the lack of co-ordination in the two countries’ laws? 
                                                 
51 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Action 2, 2015 Final Report, Summaries of the Report, 
Annex 1 – Overview of the BEPS Packages; 
 
52 P. Valente, “Rapporto OECD 2011: tax planning aggressivo e legittimo” in Corriere Tributario 28/2011 pag. 
2304. 
 
53 See Carman, P. BEPS Action 2: hybrid mismatch arrangements, in Derivatives and financial instruments. - 
Amsterdam. - Vol. 17 (2015), no. 3 ; 13 p. 
 
54 OECD, “Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, Action 2, 2015 Final Report”. 
 
55 Peterson, J., Action 2: Neutralizing the effect of hybrid mismatch arrangements, International tax review. - 
London. - Vol. 26 (2015), no. 10 (December 2015/January 2016) ; p. 26-27, 2015; 
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Domestic law changes. Under the BEPS project, countries will deny tax exemption for 
payments that are deductible in other jurisdiction. If this does not happen countries will 
neutralize the mismatch by denying the deduction claimed by the payer. In this way it is 
possible to eliminate hybrid mismatch.  
There are four reports based on Hybrid Mismatches arrangements: the Interim Report, 
published in 2014, which was only a draft report; the 2015 Final report, which was the final 
report based on the 2014 Interim report; the Discussion Draft published in 2016; and finally 
the more complete report is the 2017 Report focused on branch Mismatch Arrangements.  
Nonetheless, only two reports published in 2015 and 2017 have been fundamental for the 
comprehension and the analysis of this topic. These reports however are not the final ones, 
because others are going to be published in the next few years to make corrections and 
implementations. 56 
 
2.3.1 - OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Neutralizing the Effects of 
Hybrid Mismatches Arrangements, 2015 Final Report 
 
 
This report, deeply discussed by Girona in his study57, supersedes the interim report 
“Neutralizing the Effect of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements” (OECD, 2014) that was released 
as part of the first set of BEPS deliverables in September 2014. Compared to that report, the 
recommendations in Part I added further guidance and examples to explain how the rules have 
been introduced. Further work has also been undertaken on asset transfer transactions (such as 
stock-lending and repo transactions), imported hybrid mismatches, and the treatment of a 
payment that is included as income under a controlled foreign company (CFC) regime. 58 
As explained in the 2014 Interim report, countries can still decide freely their policy choices 
regarding whether the hybrid mismatch rules should be applied to misalignments arising 
because of intra-group hybrid capital. One country can chooses not to apply these rules to 
neutralize a hybrid mismatch in respect of a particular hybrid instrument. This will not 
damage other country’s policy choices.  The OECD, “Neutralizing the Effects of Hybrid 
                                                 
56 See references to the studies of the first International Commentators on Hybrid Mismatches, v.  
- De Boer R., Marres O., BEPS Action 2: Neutralizing the Effects on Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, in 
Intertax, n. 43, Issue 1, 2015, pag. 14 ss.; 
- De Broe L., At Last, Some Output on the Fight…, cit.;  
- Dourado A. P., May You Live In Interesting Times, in Intertax, n. 44, 2016, Issue 1, pag. 2 ss. 
 
57 Girona, E., New anti-hybrid and anti-abuse tax measures, Derivatives and financial instruments. - Amsterdam. 
- Vol. 17 (2015), no. 5 ; 7 p., 2015; 
 
58 OECD, “Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, Action 2, 2015 Final Report”. 
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Mismatch Arrangements”, Action 2, Executive Summary on 2015 Final Report describes with 
interesting details the two sections in which the above-cited Report is divided. The description 
of the two sections are reported below.  
Part I of the report identifies recommendations for regulations to address mismatches in tax 
outcomes whether they arise in respect of payments made under a hybrid financial 
instruments or payment made to or by a hybrid entity. 59  It suggests also rules to marks 
indirect mismatches that arise when the effects of a hybrid mismatch arrangement are brought 
into a third jurisdiction. These recommendations are transposed into a form of linking rules 
that bring at the same level the tax treatment of an instrument or entity and the tax treatment 
in the counterparty jurisdiction. This without interfering with the commercial outcomes. 60 
The rules apply automatically and there is a rule order in the form of a primary rule and a 
secondary or defensive rule. This prevents more than one country to apply the rule for same 
arrangements and avoid double taxation. 61 
The recommendation of the primary rule is that countries deny the taxpayer’s deduction for a 
payment to the extent that it is not included in the taxable income of the recipient in the 
counterparty jurisdiction or it is also deductible in the counterparty jurisdiction. If the primary 
rule is not applied, then the counterparty jurisdiction can generally apply a defensive rule, 
requiring the deductible payment to be included in income or denying the duplicate deduction 
depending on the nature of the mismatch. 62 
The report recognizes the importance of co-ordination in the implementation and application 
of the hybrid mismatch rules to ensure that the rules are effective and to minimize compliance 
and administration costs for taxpayers and tax administrations. It sets out a common set of 
design principles and defined terms intended to ensure consistency in the application of the 
rules. 63 
 
Part II addresses the section of Action 2 aimed at ensuring that hybrid instruments and 
entities, as well as dual resident entities, are not used to obtain unduly the benefits of tax 
                                                 
59 OECD, “Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, Action 2, 2015 Final Report”. 
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63 OECD/G20, Neutralize the Effects of Hybrid Mismatches Arrangements, Action 2, 2015 Final Report. 
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treaties and that tax treaties do not prevent the application of the changes to domestic law 
recommended in Part I. 64 
Part II examines the issue of dual resident entities, i.e. entities that are residents of two States 
for tax purposes.  
Part II also deals with the application of tax treaties to hybrid entities, i.e. entities that are not 
treated as taxpayers by either or both States that have entered into a tax treaty (such as 
partnerships in many countries). The report proposes to include in the OECD Model Tax 
Convention (OECD, 2010) a new provision and detailed Commentary that will ensure that 
benefits of tax treaties are granted, in appropriate cases, to the income of these entities, but 
also that these benefits are not granted if neither State treats, under its domestic law, the 
income of such an entity as the income of one of its residents. 65 
Finally, Part II addresses potential treaty issues that could arise from the recommendations in 
Part I. It first examines treaty issues related to rules that would result in the denial of a 
deduction or would require the inclusion of a payment in ordinary income and concludes that 
tax treaties would generally not prevent the application of these rules. 66 It then examines the 
impact of the recommendations of Part I with respect to tax treaty rules related to the 
elimination of double taxation and notes that problems could arise in the case of bilateral tax 
treaties that provide for the application of the exemption method with respect to dividends 
received from foreign companies. The report describes possible changes in treaty that would 
address these problems. The last issue dealt with in Part II is the possible impact of tax treaty 
rules concerning non-discrimination on the recommendations of Part I. 67 
 
2.3.2 - OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Neutralizing the Effects of 
Branch Mismatch Arrangements, 2017 Report 
 
 
As introduced in the paragraph above there is an Executive Summary for the OECD/G20 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Neutralizing the Effects of Branch Mismatch 
Arrangements, 2017 Report. Hereafter is reported an extract of it. The 2017 report sets out 
recommendations for branch mismatch rules that would bring the treatment of these structures 
                                                 
64 OECD/G20, Neutralize the Effects of Hybrid Mismatches Arrangements, Action 2, 2015 Final Report. 
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into line with the treatment of hybrid mismatch arrangements as set out in the 2015 Report on 
Neutralizing the Effects of Hybrids Mismatch Arrangements (Action 2 Report). 68 Branch 
mismatches arise where the ordinary rules for allocating income and expenditure between the 
branch and head office result in a portion of the net income of the taxpayer escaping the 
charge to taxation in both the branch and residence jurisdiction. Unlike hybrid mismatches, 
which result from conflicts in the legal treatment of entities or instruments, branch 
mismatches are the result of differences in the way the branch and head office account for a 
payment made by or to the branch. 69 The 2017 report identifies five basic types of branch 
mismatch arrangements that give rise to one of three types of mismatches: deduction / no 
inclusion (D/NI) outcomes, double deduction (DD) outcomes, and indirect deduction / no 
inclusion (indirect D/NI) outcomes. This report includes specific recommendations for 
improvements to domestic law intended to reduce the frequency of branch mismatches as well 
as targeted branch mismatch rules that adjust the tax consequences in either the residence or 
branch jurisdiction in order to neutralize the hybrid mismatch without disturbing any of the 
other tax, commercial or regulatory outcomes. The annexes of the report summaries the 
recommendations and set out a number of examples illustrating the intended operation of the 
recommended rules.70 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, 2015 Final Report, Executive Summary. 
 
69 OECD Website, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, 2017 Report, Executive Summary. 
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3 – The Anti-Tax Avoidance Package 
 
 
Imagine a world in which everyone pays their fair share of taxes and have these revenues by 
keeping up schools, hospitals and a public transport running always on time. Unfortunately, 
this is not a perfect world. Some multinational companies operating in Europe do not pay 
their amount of taxes and that means billions in lost tax revenues. That money that are not 
going to be used for schools, hospitals or public services like buses and trains are going to be 
wasted.   
 
This tax avoidance by large multinational firms can also result in a higher taxes built for 
everyone else. Tax avoidance is made possible by all the loopholes, complexities and 
inconsistencies in the tax loss of different EU countries. If one country’s tax laws are not in 
tune with the others, multinational companies can take advantage, and they do so because 
every year about one in five euros of corporate tax is lost in tax avoidance. This is why the 
European Commission is pushing back. It is time to stop imaging a simpler system, and start 
building it. It is time for fair and effective taxation for all Europeans. 
 
Only a few months after the OECD released its Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) 
package for the reform of the international tax system to tackle perceived tax avoidance, 71 the 
European Commission presented a set of proposals titled the "Anti-Tax Avoidance Package". 
72  
Before proceed further with the explanation of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Package and the Anti-
Tax Avoidance Directive, I think it is crucial pointing out that the BEPS package is a different 
report compared to the ATA directive. BEPS project provides only recommendations that 
Countries can decide to implement or not. OCSE does not force Countries to adopt these new 
measures on different matters, it only gives suggestions on how to detect and how to avoid 
such a new measures. 73  On the other hand, ATA Directive is a document provided by the 
European Union and gives rules that every European Countries must adopt. ATA Directive 
does not give recommendations, but provides defining rules. To sum up this subsection, we 
                                                 
71 OECD, "Final BEPS package for reform of the international tax system to tackle tax avoidance," Oct. 2015. 
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can say that the main difference from BEPS project and the ATA Directive is that the BEPS 
project provides only “soft” laws while the ATA Directive imposes “hard” laws.   
The "tax avoidance package" consists of a series of EU legislative and non-legislative 
initiatives with the scope of strengthening the rules against corporate tax avoidance and 
making company taxation in the EU fairer, simpler and effective. 74  
It is based on the recommendations of the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development) formulated in 2014 to address the problem of tax base erosion and profit 
transfer.  
The Package contains concrete measures to prevent aggressive tax planning, boost tax 
transparency and create a leveled playing field for all businesses in the EU. 75 It will help 
Member States take strong and coordinated action against tax avoidance and ensure that 
companies pay tax wherever they make their profits in the EU. 76 77 
 
The sections of the Anti-tax avoidance package 78 are Chapeau Communication, which 
enumerate the political, economic and international context of the Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Package and highlights the elements of disparities between parties; Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Directive, which will be discussed deeply in the following chapter, lists five pillars that every 
Member States should follow to operate against aggressive tax planning. The scope of this 
Directive is to give EU a defense shield against corporate tax avoidance, while ensuring a 
easier and stable environment for businesses. The Revision of the Administrative Cooperation 
Directive passes a country by country reporting project to be adopted by Member States' tax 
authorities with the aim of improving tax-related information on companies which operates in 
the European Union. The critical element in the country-by-country reporting is that the 
information must be of maximum importance. Another pillar of the ATA 79 package is the 
Recommendation on Tax Treaties that has the scope of toughen the Member States’ tax 
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treaties against every aggressive tax planners. It contains a brief description of general anti-
abuse rules and definition of permanent establishment. On the next section regarding 
Communication on an External Strategy for Effective Taxation, the European Union 
introduces a new approach for third countries. The relations with a hypothetical third country 
it is therefore suggested according to this pillar.  For tax purposes, therefore, there is an EU 
list of third countries. Finally yet importantly, we have the fifth pillar: the Study on 
Aggressive Tax Planning. This section understands and discovers Member States’ corporate 
tax rules that, according to the European Union legal system, could harm competition by 
facilitating aggressive tax planning and tax exemption.  
To make the job easier for EU Member States this section includes factsheets with the main 
findings for each Member State and examples of tactics used by multinationals to lower their 
taxes.80 
The next chapter will be focused on the principals of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive 
(ATAD). 
 
 
3.1 - Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD) 
 
The scope of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, national directive 2016/1164/UE which is 
part of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Package of the EU, is to introduce in the EU countries a set of 
rules for preventing tax avoidance. The focal point of this directive is to create a fairer, 
simpler and more effective corporate taxation in the EU. 81 
 
One of the key elements of this Anti-Tax Avoidance Package is the “Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Directive” that proposes five legally binding anti-abuse measures, which all Members should 
apply against common forms of aggressive tax planning. 82 Anti-tax avoidance and aggressive 
tax planning preventive measures, established by the ATAD, has the job of granting a single 
tax principle in cross border taxation by eliminating disparities between national tax systems, 
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which create loopholes. These measures intervene in fiscal sovereignty of the Member States 
in an attempt to ensure allocation of taxing powers based on the principle of fair taxation. 83 
In general, “tax avoidance” is defined as unacceptable or abusive, whereas “tax planning” is 
acceptable and sometimes encouraged by the law. 84 
 
In the Directive, there are the following areas of work.  The controlled foreign companies 
(CFC) rule 85 has the role of deterring profit shifting to a law/no tax country. Before the 
introduction of this rule, companies were able to shift their profits to dependent companies in 
low/no tax countries reducing the taxable profit in the EU. With the use of the CFC rule, 
companies can still shift their profits, but those profits will now be taxable in the EU. The 
switchover rule, as a second measure, will prevent double non-taxation of certain income. An 
EU based company, at first, invests in another company based in a low-tax country outside 
the EU. Dividends are then, in turn, paid back to the EU-based company, where Member 
States treat them as having already been properly taxed in the third country. Nevertheless, this 
is rarely the case. Thanks to the new rule, happens that Member States would have to tax 
dividends into the EU if they have not already been properly taxed. The exit taxation rule is 
the third measure, which prevent companies from avoiding tax when re-locating assets. Big 
multinationals allocate huge amount of time and energy developing new products. Therefore, 
companies based in the EU can develop a promising new product and move it to a no-tax 
country before it is finalized. In this way, the company pays less tax on the profits in the EU. 
The new tax exit rule ensure that Member States can impose tax on the value of the product 
before it is moved out of the EU. The Exit Taxation targets unrealized appreciation of assets 
to taxation based on the market value when the assets, residence or business leaves the tax 
jurisdiction. The market value is the amount for which an asset can be exchanged or a mutual 
obligations can be settled between willing and unrelated buyers and sellers in a direct 
transaction. 86 The role of deterring unnatural debt agreement created to lower taxes is 
describe in Interest limitation section. Giving an example to better understand the issue, a 
company based in the EU builds a subsidiary in a low tax country providing a loan back to the 
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company or another company again based in the European Union soil. According to these 
facts, the EU-based company will have high interest and tax-deductible payments back. 
Interest limitation rules would limit the amount of interest that a company can deduct. 87 This 
will increase the amount of tax it pays. 88 
  
The last measure adopted and developed by the ATAD directive, is the general anti abuse 
rule that confront aggressive tax planning if other rules cannot be applied. Previously, 
companies engaged in aggressive tax planning always tried to find ways to bypass rules and 
find loopholes in tax laws. Now, General anti-abuse rules (GAAR) give EU countries the 
power to tackle artificial tax arrangements if other specific rules do not cover it. The 
Commission explains that the political objective of the GAAR is to close any gap in respect of 
existing specific anti-abusive mechanisms in this area. These Abusive Tax Planning schemes 
develop rapidly and the tax legislation is unable to keep up with their pace. This is why the 
GAAR is a useful tool in taxation to capture tax-avoidance practices despite the absence of a 
specific anti-avoidance rule. 89 
 
This European Directive 2016/1164 took the burden of fighting the tax avoidance practices, 
which could and already have an active part in the internal market of the country. There are 
therefore several limits to aggressive tax planning with respect to the corporate groups, which 
exploit differences between internal and external national fiscal systems. 
 
There are numerous pillars to be set in order to fully understand the aim of the ATAD 
Directive. A fertile soil must be arranged in order to let this directive affect the European 
Economy. Before discussing the main articles of this Directive, it is crucial to understand 
some principles behind that.   
 
It is critical therefore to restore the trust in the fairness of tax systems and to allow 
governments to effectively operate their fiscal sovereignty. These new political objectives 
have been translated into “recommendations” for concrete actions in the framework of the 
initiative against erosion of the tax base and profit transfer (BEPS) of the Organization for 
                                                 
87 Anti-Tax Avoidance Package Factsheets, from the European Commission Website. 
 
88 Helminen, EU Tax Law: Direct Taxation, 66; 
 
89 Popa, O., An overview of ATAD implementation in EU Member States, European taxation. - Amsterdam. - 
Vol. 59 (2019), no. 2/3 ; p. 120-122, 2019; 
 
26 
 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).90 A common framework could prevent a 
fragmentation of the market and put an end to currently existing mismatches and market 
distortions. National implementing measures, therefore, would provide taxpayers with legal 
certainty in that those measures would be compatible with Union law.91  
 
It is necessary to lay down rules in order to strengthen the average level of protection against 
aggressive tax planning in the internal market, with the aim to improve its effectiveness as a 
whole in confronting tax avoidance practices.92  
It is necessary to define rules against the erosion of tax bases in the internal market and the 
shifting of profits out of the internal market. Regulations are necessary in achieving the main 
objectives which are the limitation to the deductibility of interest, exit taxation, a general anti-
abuse rule, controlled foreign company rules and rules to tackle hybrid mismatches. These 
guidelines should not only aim to counter tax avoidance practices, but also to avoid creating 
other obstacles to the market, such as double taxation.93 
 
In the following part, I will give a complete description of the main elements of the Council 
Directive 2016/1164 and then I will compare it with the most recent one.  
Trying to reduce their global tax liability, companies have engaged in BEPS, through 
excessive interest payments. The interest limitation rule is necessary to discourage such 
practices by limiting the deductibility of taxpayers' exceeding borrowing costs. 94 It is 
therefore necessary to fix a ratio for deductibility, which refers to a taxpayer's taxable 
earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). 95 
  
                                                 
90 Official journal of the European Union, COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016, paragraph 
1. 
 
91 Official journal of the European Union, COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016, paragraph 
2. 
 
92 Official journal of the European Union, COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016, paragraph 
3. 
 
93 Official journal of the European Union, COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016, paragraph 
5. 
 
94 See the Interest Limitation rule (Article 4 ATAD). 
 
95 Official journal of the European Union, COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016, paragraph 
6 
 
27 
 
Where the taxpayer is part of a group, which files statutory consolidated accounts, the 
indebtedness of the overall group at worldwide level may be considered for the purpose of 
granting taxpayers entitlement to deduct higher amounts of exceeding borrowing costs.  
The interest limitation rule should apply in relation to a taxpayer's exceeding borrowing costs 
without distinction of whether the costs originate in debt taken out nationally, 96 cross-border 
within the Union or with a third country, or whether they originate from third parties, 
associated enterprises or intra-group.97 
To reduce the administrative and compliance burden of the rules without significantly 
diminishing their tax effect, it may be appropriate to provide for a safe harbor rule so that net 
interest is always deductible up to a fixed amount, when this leads to a higher deduction than 
the EBITDA-based ratio. Member States could reduce the fixed monetary threshold in order 
to ensure a higher level of protection of their domestic tax base. Since BEPS, in principle, 
takes place through excessive interest payments among entities, which are associated 
enterprises, it is appropriate and necessary to allow the possible exclusion of standalone 
entities from the scope of the interest limitation rule, given the limited risks of tax avoidance. 
In order to facilitate the transition to the new interest limitation rule, Member States could 
provide for a grandfathering clause that would cover existing loans to the extent that their 
terms are not subsequently modified. 98 
 
Exit taxes have the function of ensuring that where a taxpayer moves assets or its tax 
residence out of the tax jurisdiction of a State, that State taxes the economic value of any 
capital gain created in its territory even though that gain has not yet been realized at the time 
of the exit. It is therefore necessary to specify cases in which taxpayers are subject to exit tax 
rules and taxed on unrealized capital gains, which have been built in their transferred assets. 
The right to tax should be defined at national level. 99  
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General anti-abuse rules (GAARs) are present in tax systems to tackle abusive tax practices. 
GAARs should be applied to arrangements that are not genuine, otherwise the taxpayer 
should have the right to choose the most tax efficient structure for its commercial affairs. It is 
furthermore important to ensure that the GAARs apply in domestic situations, within the 
Union and vis-à-vis third countries in a uniform manner, so that their scope and results of 
application in domestic and cross-border situations do not differ. 100 
 
Controlled foreign company (CFC) rules have the effect of re-attributing the income of a low-
taxed controlled subsidiary to its parent company. Then, the parent company becomes taxable 
on this attributed income in the State where it is resident for tax purposes. In particular, in 
order to ensure that CFC rules are a proportionate response to BEPS concerns, it is critical 
that Member States, that limit their CFC rules to income which has been artificially diverted 
to the subsidiary, precisely target situations where most of the decision-making functions 
which generated diverted income at the level of the controlled subsidiary, are carried out in 
the Member State of the taxpayer. It is necessary that the CFC rules extend to the profits of 
permanent establishments which are not subject to tax or are tax exempt in the Member State 
of the taxpayer. In order to ensure a higher level of protection, Member States could reduce 
the control threshold, or employ a higher threshold in comparing the actual corporate tax paid 
with the corporate tax that would have been charged in the Member State of the taxpayer. In 
transposing CFC rules into their national law, Member States use white, grey or black lists of 
third countries, which are compiled based on certain criteria set out in this Directive and may 
include the corporate tax rate level. 101 
  
Hybrid mismatches are the consequence of differences in the legal characterization of 
payments (financial instruments) or entities and those differences surface in the interaction 
between the legal systems of two jurisdictions. The effect of such mismatches is often a 
double deduction (i.e. deduction in both states) or a deduction of the income in one state 
without inclusion in the tax base of the other. To neutralize the effects of hybrid mismatch 
arrangements, it is necessary to lay down rules whereby one of the two jurisdictions in a 
mismatch should deny the deduction of a payment leading to such an outcome. In this 
context, it is useful to clarify that measures aimed to tackle hybrid mismatches in this 
                                                 
100 Official journal of the European Union, COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016, paragraph 
11 
 
101 Official journal of the European Union, COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016, paragraph 
12 
 
29 
 
Directive are aimed to tackle mismatch situations attributable to differences in the legal 
characterization of a financial instrument or entity and are not intended to affect the general 
features of the tax system of a Member State. 102 
 
Considering that, a key objective of this Directive is to improve the resilience of the internal 
market as a whole against cross-border tax avoidance practices, this cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States acting individually. It would thus allow inefficiencies and 
distortions to persist in the interaction of distinct national measures. The result would be lack 
of coordination. Instead, due to the fact that much inefficiency in the internal market primarily 
gives rise to problems of a cross-border nature, remedial measures should be adopted at 
European Union level. It is therefore critical to adopt solutions that function for the internal 
market as a whole and this can be better achieved at European Union level. This Directive 
only aims to achieve the essential minimum degree of coordination within the Union for the 
purpose of materializing its objectives.103  
 
As mentioned before there are several areas that compose this directive.  
The first area intervenes on the measures against tax avoidance. The article 4 in particular 
outlines the rules on interest limitation and the Article 5 emphasize the exit taxation 
directives. 
It is worth mentioning some features of the Article 5 regarding the exit taxation. 
A taxpayer shall be subject to tax at an amount equal to the market value of the transferred 
assets, at the time of exit of the assets, less their value for tax purposes, in any of the 
following circumstances: 104 
1. taxpayer transfers assets from its head office to its permanent establishment in another 
Member State or in a third country in so far as the Member State of the head office no 
longer has the right to tax the transferred assets due to the transfer;  
2. taxpayer transfers assets from its permanent establishment in a Member State to its 
head office or another permanent establishment in another Member State or in a third 
                                                 
102 Official journal of the European Union, COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016, paragraph 
13 
 
103 Official journal of the European Union, COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016, paragraph 
16 
 
104 Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Official journal of the European Union, COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (EU) 
2016/1164 of 12 July 2016; 
 
30 
 
country in so far as the Member State of the permanent establishment no longer has 
the right to tax the transferred assets due to the transfer;  
3. a taxpayer transfers its tax residence to another Member State or to a third country, 
except for those assets which remain effectively connected with a permanent 
establishment in the first Member State;  
4. a taxpayer transfers the business carried on by its permanent establishment from a 
Member State to another Member State or to a third country in so far as the Member 
State of the permanent establishment no longer has the right to tax the transferred 
assets due to the transfer.  
 
Article 6 introduces the General Anti-Abuse Rule (general anti-abuse clause) according to 
which, due to the imposition of companies, Member States are required to ignore the 
constructions (legal or fiscal) which, put in place for the purpose main to obtain a tax 
advantage in contrast to the object or purpose of the applicable law, they are not genuine 
having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances. A construction or a series of 
constructions are considered "not genuine" to the extent that they have not been put in place 
for valid commercial reasons that reflect economic reality.105 
 
Referring to foreign subsidiaries (controlled foreign companies - CFCs), the directive (article 
7) pursues the aim of preventing corporate groups from transferring their profits to group 
companies based in States with taxation that is more favorable to the purpose to reduce the 
overall tax burden. As also emerges from the recitals, the rules on CFCs intend to re-allocate 
the income of a subsidiary company subject to low taxation to the parent company; the latter 
is therefore taxable for the income that has been attributed to it in the State in which it is 
resident for tax purposes. Member States may exempt from this regulation some entities with 
low earnings or a low profit margin that involve lower risks of tax avoidance. 
 
The article 7 says that the Member State of a taxpayer shall treat an entity, or a permanent 
establishment of which the profits are not subject to tax or are exempt from tax in that 
Member State, as a controlled foreign company where the following conditions are met:  
a) in the case of an entity, the taxpayer by itself, or together with its associated 
enterprises holds a direct or indirect participation of more than 50 percent of the 
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voting rights, or owns directly or indirectly more than 50 percent of capital or is 
entitled to receive more than 50 percent of the profits of that entity;  
b) the actual corporate tax paid on its profits by the entity or permanent establishment is 
lower than the difference between the corporate tax that would have been charged on 
the entity or permanent establishment under the applicable corporate tax system in the 
Member State of the taxpayer and the actual corporate tax paid on its profits by the 
entity or permanent establishment.106 
 
The directive also deals with regulating the so-called phenomenon of the hybrids mismatches. 
The Article 9 of the directive describes a situation arising between a taxpayer in a Member 
State and an associated company in another Member State. There can be two outcomes as per 
article 9. 
One type of hybrid mismatch results in a double deduction, the deduction shall be given only 
in the Member State where such payment has its source.  
The other results in a deduction without inclusion, the Member State of the payer shall deny 
the deduction of such payment.107 
 
To prevent transnational groups from taking advantage of differences in the Member States' 
legislative systems to reduce their tax burden, Article 9 of the directive provides that to the 
extent that a hybrid mismatch causes a double deduction, the deduction apply only in the 
Member State where the payment originates. 
 
On May 29th 2017, a new version of the Council Directive 2016/1164 was published. 108 The 
Council of the European Union, to shed lights on a particular and fundamental topic, created 
the new Directive. This matter was only mentioned in the article 9 of the previous Directive 
and so, since this is of critical importance nowadays, the new Council Directive 2017/952 is 
precisely focus on it. This new subject is the hybrid mismatch 
 
                                                 
106 Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Official journal of the European Union, COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (EU) 
2016/1164 of 12 July 2016; 
 
107 Article 9 paragraphs 1-2, of the Official journal of the European Union, COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (EU) 
2016/1164 of 12 July 2016; 
 
108 Semonella F., “Brevi rilessioni in tema di edit tax alla luce dell’attuazione della direttiva ATAD”, rivista di 
Diritto Tributario online, 31 Gennaio 2019. 
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To better understand the concept of hybrid mismatches, a newer vision of them will be the 
focus of the next chapter regarding their main differences between the ATAD1 and the so-
called ATAD2. 
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4 - Hybrid Mismatches  
 
4.1 - History 
 
 
Hybrid mismatch arrangements exploit differences in the tax treatment of an entity or 
instrument under the laws of two or more tax jurisdictions to achieve double non-taxation, 
including long-term deferral. 109 These types of arrangements are widespread and result in a 
substantial erosion of the taxable bases of the countries concerned. They have an overall 
negative impact on competition, efficiency, transparency and fairness. 110 
The concept of hybrid mismatch is an issue that has been addressed in time and scholars have 
always tried to find effective methods to contrast this. Initially with poor results and then 
subsequently, with the recent regulations and Legislative Decree, an attempt was made to 
provide a concrete and truthful analysis of this longstanding topic. The legislative body that 
tried to find a solution and that worked the most on the analysis of hybrid mismatches was the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).  
OECD uses its wealth of information on a broad range of topics to help governments foster 
prosperity and fight poverty through economic growth and financial stability. 111 It helps 
ensure the environmental implications of economic and social development. OECD's work is 
based on continuous monitoring of events in member countries as well as outside OECD area, 
and includes regular projections of short and medium-term economic developments. The 
OECD Secretariat collects and analyses data after which committees discuss policy regarding 
this information, the Council makes decisions, and then governments implement 
recommendations. 112 
 
The mission of the OECD is to promote policies that will improve the economic and social 
well-being of people around the world. The OECD provides a forum in which governments 
can work together to share experiences and seek solutions to common problems.  
The OECD has several core values that drives their choices. OECD must have an objective, 
their analyses and recommendations are independent and evidence-based. OECD has to be 
                                                 
109 OECD/G20, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, Action 2, “Neutralising the Effectd of Hybrid Mismatch 
Arrangements”, 2015 Final Report; 
 
110 Financial Times, “Successive restructuring allowed Moody’s to cut tax rate”; 
 
111 OECD website http://www.oecd.org/. 
 
112 Ibidem. 
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open by means of encouraging debate and understanding critical issue. A bold shade of 
behavior and being a pioneer is crucial to challenge conventional wisdom and address 
emerging and long-term challenges. The last, but not least, core value is ethic, the OECD 
credibility is built on trust, integrity and transparency.   
OECD has begun treating the hybrid mismatch issue in 2010 when it published “Addressing 
Tax Risks Involving Bank Losses”. This report highlighted the use of hybrid mismatches in 
context of international banking and recommended that revenue bodies “bring to the attention 
of their government tax policy officials those situations which may potentially raise policy 
issues.113 
 A similar content has been reformulated for the OECD, 2011 report on “Corporate Loss 
Utilization through Aggressive Tax Planning”. That new report recommended countries to 
consider introducing restrictions on multiple use of the same loss to the extent they are 
concerned with these results. Both of these reports have been introduced to obviate to some 
negative impact that hybrid mismatches have on competition, efficiency, transparency and 
fairness.  
 
Following these first two reports, concerns have been raised by a number of OECD member 
countries. As a result, the OECD undertook a review with interested member countries to 
identify examples of tax planning schemes involving hybrid mismatched arrangements and to 
assess the effectiveness of response strategies adopted by those countries.  
The result of these concerns and the review culminated with a new report issued in 2012 by 
the OECD. The report focused on “Hybrid Mismatches Arrangements: Tax Policy and 
Compliance Issues”. The Hybrid Mismatch Report set out a number of policy options to 
address such hybrid mismatches arrangements and concluded that domestic law rules, which 
link the task treatment of an entity, instrument or transfer to the tax assessment in another 
country had significant potential as a tool to address hybrid mismatch arrangements. The 
creation of a policy option called “linking rule” was a solution given as a result of those 
reports. This option regards a link between the approaches in one country and the treatment in 
the other countries. Although this “linking rules” make the application of domestic law more 
complicated, the Hybrid Mismatch Report noted that such rules are not a novelty as, at the 
beginning, foreign tax credit rules, under tax clauses and controlled foreign company (CFC) 
rules often do precisely that. 
 
                                                 
113 OECD/G20 BEPS Project, Neutralizing the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, Action 2, 2015 Final 
Report; 
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After the release of the report Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting in February 2013, 
OECD and G20 countries decided to adopt a 15-point Action Plan starting from September 
2013. The Action Plan identified 15 actions described in 13 reports concerning three main 
pillars: introducing coherence in the domestic rules that affects cross-border activities, 
reinforcing requirements in the existing international standards, and improving transparency 
and certainty. 114 
 
After that, the OECD worked on a new report that had a particular focus on Hybrid 
Mismatches Arrangements. That report develops a model for the neutralization of the effects 
of hybrid instruments and entities. In fact, at first, in 2014, an “Interim Report” was issued by 
the OECD under BEPS Action Plan, called “Action 2, Neutralizing the Effects of Hybrid 
Mismatch Arrangements”.   
The 2014 “Interim Report” developed a model treaty provisions and recommendations 
regarding the design of domestic rules to detect and neutralize the effects of hybrid 
instruments and entities. 115 This may include:  
- changes to the OECD Model Tax Convention to ensure that hybrid instruments and 
entities (as well as dual resident entities) are not used to obtain the benefits of treaties 
unduly;  
- domestic law provisions that prevent exemption or non-recognition for payments that 
are deductible by the payer;  
- domestic law provisions that deny a deduction for a payment that is not includible in 
income by the recipient (and is not subject to taxation under controlled foreign 
company (CFC) or similar rules);  
- domestic law provisions that deny a deduction for a payment that is also deductible in 
another jurisdiction; 
- guidance on co-ordination or tie-breaker rules if more than one country seeks to apply 
such rules to a transaction or structure.  
Special attention should be given to the interaction between possible changes to domestic law 
and the provisions of the OECD Model Tax Convention. 116 
                                                 
114 OECD/G20, OECD/G20 BEPS Project, “Neutralizing the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements”, 
Action 2, 2015 Final Report, “Introduction”. 
 
115 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, “Neutralizing the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch 
Arrangements”, Action 2, 2014 Interim Report. 
 
116 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, “Neutralizing the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch 
Arrangements”, Action 2, 2014 Interim Report. 
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A new, complete and final report has been issued by the OECD in 2015 with the title 
“Neutralizing the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements”. The 2015 final report, divided 
in two parts, sets out recommendations for domestic rules to neutralize the effect of hybrid 
mismatch arrangements and includes changes to the “OECD Model Tax Convention” to 
address such arrangements.  Once translated into domestic law, the recommendations in Part I 
of the report will neutralize the effect of cross-border hybrid mismatch arrangements that 
produce multiple deductions for a single expense or a deduction in one jurisdiction with no 
corresponding taxation in the other jurisdiction. Part I of the report, therefore, sets out 
recommendations for rules to address hybrid mismatches in respect of payments made under a 
hybrid financial instrument or payments made to or by a hybrid entity.  It also recommends 
rules to address indirect mismatches that arise when the effects of a hybrid mismatch 
arrangement are imported into a third jurisdiction. 117 The recommendations are supported by 
a commentary and examples to illustrate how they should apply these indications. Part II of 
the report sets out proposed changes to the Model Convention that will ensure that the 
benefits of tax treaties are only granted to hybrid entities (including dual resident entities) in 
appropriate cases.  Part II also considers the interaction between the OECD Model 
Convention and the domestic law recommendations in Part 1. 118 
 
After another two years of work, the newest version of the report has been released in 2017 by 
the OECD.  The precise focus is on of branch mismatches rules that would bring the treatment 
of these instruments in line with the treatment of hybrid mismatch arrangements as shown in 
the 2015 Report on Neutralizing the Effects of Hybrids Mismatch Arrangements (Action 2 
Report). 
 
The last and new European Directive and Legislative Decree that have been issued on Hybrid 
Mismatches are the ATA Directive 2, that is going to be analyzed in the following pages, and 
the Legislative Decree 29 November 2018, n.142, in particular from article 6 to article 11. 
 
4.2 - Hybrid Mismatches through ATAD 1 and 2 
 
                                                 
117 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Action 2, 2015 Final Report from OECD website 
www.oecd.org. 
 
118 Ibidem. 
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Both Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD) 1 and 2 contain specific provisions to tackle 
hybrid mismatches. As a matter of principle it has been decided to not remove the cause of 
hybrid mismatches within the internal market, but to counter only a few of the symptoms of 
hybrid mismatches. 119 Measures from ATAD 1 and 2 are mainly focused on hybrid 
mismatches caused by the use of (reverse) hybrid entities. Overall, the approach chosen by the 
European Council does seems to close many of the existing loopholes through which hybrid 
mismatches are used. The main remaining question is whether all twenty-seven Member 
States will be able to consistently implement the complex anti-mismatch rules. 120 
Hybrid mismatch is a situation that can happen between a taxpayer in one Member State and 
an associated enterprise in another Member State or a structured arrangement between parties 
in Member States, where the following outcomes are attributable to differences in the legal 
definition of a financial instrument or entity:  
 a deduction of the same payment: expenses or losses occurs both in the Member State 
in which the payment has its source (the expenses are incurred or the losses are 
suffered) and in another Member State (‘double deduction’; c.d. D/D);  
 a deduction of a payment in the Member State in which the payment has its source 
without a corresponding inclusion for tax purposes of the same payment in the other 
Member State (‘deduction without inclusion’; c.d. D/NI).121 
 
 
It is worth giving some examples of these outcomes to better understand the importance of 
such results.  
The Fig. 1 below represent the situation described as Double Deduction (D/D). 
 
                                                 
119  OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Action 2, 2015 Final Report from OECD website 
www.oecd.org. 
 
120 Fibbe, G.K.Stevens, A.J.A., Hybrid mismatches under the ATAD I and II, EC tax review. - Alphen aan den 
Rijn. - Vol. 26 (2017), no. 3 ; p. 153-166, 2017; 
 
121 Article 2, paragraph 9, of the Official journal of the European Union, COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (EU) 
2016/1164 of 12 July 2016; 
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Fig. 2: Double Deduction; 
 
Hybrid Entity B is non-transparent in the third country, but considered as transparent be the 
Member State (MS). Interest payment is deducted by A Co (Company A) and by Hybrid 
Entity B and payment by B is set-off against income of C Co under group tax regime.  
Therefore, based on ATAD 2, the Member state should deny the deduction of the payment. 
 
The next figure shows the hybrid entity situation in which there is a deduction without 
inclusion (D/NI). 
 
 
Fig. 3 
 
Hybrid entity B is transparent in the Member State, but considered as non-transparent by the 
third country (reverse Hybrid Entity). Interest payment to reverse Hybrid Entity B is deducted 
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by C Co, but is neither included by the reverse Hybrid Entity B nor by A Co. Therefore, based 
on ATAD 2 instructions, the Member State should deny the deduction of the payment. 122 
 
The table here below provides a general overview of the hybrid mismatches rules 
recommended in the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project “Neutralizing the 
Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements”, Action 2, 2015 Final Report. 123 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Hybrid Mismatches, initially mentioned in the Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 
2016 (ATAD 1), are defined as misalignments that occur between two or more jurisdictions in 
the assessment and identification and regulatory classification of financial instruments, 
entities or transfers, which involve the creation of hybrids, i.e. entities or instruments that are 
qualified differently depending on the country of origin. 
 
In the first part we mentioned several pillars which play a central role in the concept of hybrid 
mismatches and it is necessary, for the understanding of the following chapters, to carefully 
analyze these players together with a list of visual examples, including graphics. 
  
The active players that characterize hybrid mismatches are: 
                                                 
122 European Commission, ATAD 2; 
 
123 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project Neutralizing the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch 
Arrangements, Action 2, 2015 Final Report; 
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- financial instruments, that are defined as “any instrument that gives rise to positive 
components of income belonging to a legal financing relationship or an investment of 
capital and subject to taxation according to the corresponding rules regarding debt, 
equity or derivative relationships, based on the laws of the beneficiary's or payer's 
jurisdiction; 124 
- hybrid entity, that identifies any entity or agreement which, under the legislation of a 
State, is considered a taxable person for the purposes of income tax and whose 
positive and negative income components are considered positive and negative 
components of income of another or other taxable persons under the laws of another 
jurisdiction; 125 
- disregarded permanent establishment, which represents the exercise of activity 
which, based on the jurisdiction of residence of the tax payer, constitutes a stable 
organization and which, under the laws of the other jurisdiction, does not constitute a 
stable organization. 126 
 
 
Table 2: Hybrids Players 
 
 
It looks indeed clear the aim of these elements. They are, therefore, international schemes 
aimed at obtaining tax savings through aggressive tax planning, which exploit the disparity of 
                                                 
124 Article 6, comma 1, letter l), DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 29 novembre 2018, n. 142; 
 
125Article 6, comma 1, letter i), DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 29 novembre 2018, n. 142; 
 
126Article 6, comma 1, letter p), DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 29 novembre 2018, n. 142; 
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the legislation involved. To avoid the proliferation of these harmful tax practices, the 
international community has intervened with tax and regulatory projects, such as the 
European Directive and the Base Erosion and Profit Sharing, with the aim of providing aid 
and answers to a fiscal phenomenon that generates the erosion of the tax base. 
 
It is therefore necessary to mention the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which studies the 
aforementioned tax problems and reflects the thinking of the international community trying 
to answer and solve the perennial problem of fiscal erosion. To arrive at a practical and 
effective solution to the OECD had to work on domestic law and international treaties. 
 
The ATAD 1 directive does not contain specific measures aimed at counteracting the hybrid 
mismatches deriving from the interaction between the regimes of companies belonging to 
Member States. However, there is a clear reference to a future project in which the aim is to 
implement a directive at a European level. It is, hence, mandatory to establish rules aimed at 
neutralizing the hybrids mismatches in a manner that is as comprehensive as possible. 
Considering that the Directive (EU) 2016/1164 governs only the hybrids mismatches 
derivatives from the interaction between the taxation systems of member state companies, on 
12 July 2016 the Ecofin Council issued a statement in which it asked the Commission to 
advance , by October 2016, a proposal on hybrid mismatches involving third countries.127  
 
This reference to a future deepening of the discipline of hybrid misalignments has become 
reality thanks to the new ATAD 2 regulation (EU Directive 2017/952 of the Council of 29 
May 2017) as duly discussed by Balco T. in his work. 128 With this new directive, the anti-
hybrid measures previously provided for in Directive (EU) 2016/1164 are then implemented 
into the European Union Legislation.  
 
The Directive (EU) 2016/1164 includes rules on hybrid mismatches between Member States. 
Therefore, it should include also rules in relation to third part countries, if at least one of the 
parties involved is a legal person subject to corporate tax or, in the case of inverse hybrids, an 
entity in a Member State, as well as rules on imported mismatches. Consequently, following 
                                                 
127 Considerando n.5 della Direttiva (UE) 2017/952 del Consiglio del 29 maggio 2017; 
 
128 Balco T., ATAD 2: Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, European taxation. - Amsterdam. - Vol. 57 (2017), no. 4 ; 
p. 127-136, 2017; 
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the drafting of Directive 2017/952, the rules on hybrid mismatches and on tax residence 
mismatches should apply to all taxpayers subject to corporate taxation in a Member State, 
including to permanent establishments, or to agreements treated as permanent establishments 
of entities resident in third part countries. The rules on reverse hybrids mismatches should 
apply to all entities treated as transparent for tax purposes by a Member State. 129 
 
In implementing this Directive, Member States should make use of the explanations and 
applicable examples reported in the OECD BEPS report on Action 2, both as an illustrative or 
interpretative source, to the extent that they are consistent with the provisions of the this 
European Directive and with the Union law. 130 
 
Therefore, the principles that report the "Actions" of the BEPS project regarding hybrid 
mismatches are of central importance for the description and understanding of the provisions 
of the European Directive (EU) 2016/1164 and, equally, have a crucial importance regarding 
the interpretation of the provisions of the new decree, ATAD 2. 
 
The aforementioned decree, as mentioned above, has implemented the previous one with 
some measures called "anti-hybrid". These measures point at countering the effects of double 
deduction or deduction without inclusion resulting from conflicts in the classification of 
financial instruments, payments, entities, permanent establishments or the allocation of 
payments. The collection of a credit not due, for foreign taxes, born from having exploited a 
situation of misalignment of financial instruments (hybrid mismatches) is also object of 
contrast. 
 
Since hybrid mismatches could lead to double deduction or deduction without inclusion, it is 
necessary to establish rules according to which the Member State concerned denies the 
deduction of a payment (expenses or losses) or requires the tax payer to include the payment 
in his taxable income, depending on the case. These rules, however, apply only to deductible 
payments and should not affect the general characteristics of a tax regime, whether it is a 
classic system or an imputation system. 131 
 
                                                 
129 Considerando n.8 della Direttiva (UE) 2017/952 del Consiglio del 29 maggio 2017; 
 
130 Considerando n.28 della Direttiva (UE) 2017/952 del Consiglio del 29 maggio 2017; 
 
131 Considerando n.9 della Direttiva (UE) 2017/952 del Consiglio del 29 maggio 2017; 
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The effects of this double deduction, or deduction without inclusion, are not the potential 
ones, but those that actually occur. The aforementioned provisions therefore operate when a 
double taxation or a deduction without inclusion is actually carried out. The term double 
taxation indicates the simultaneous deduction, deriving from countries with different 
jurisdiction, from a negative component of income that has offset a positive component of 
income that is not a double inclusion. On the other hand, the concept of deduction without 
inclusion indicates an effective deduction, in a particular jurisdiction, of a negative 
component of income that has balanced an income not with double inclusion. These 
mismatches are those that arise in a transnational context.  
 
In the new directive, Hybrids Mismatch also concerns permanent establishments residing 
outside the European Union. A misalignment from hybrid permanent establishments occurs 
when differences between the rules of the jurisdiction of the permanent establishment and the 
rules of the jurisdiction of residence, regarding the allocation of income and expenses 
between different parties of the same entity, generate a misalignment in the fiscal results. This 
includes the cases in which a misalignment occurs because a permanent establishment is not 
recognized as such under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the fixed place of business is 
located. Such misalignments could result in a double deduction or a deduction without 
inclusion and should therefore be eliminated. In the case of a permanent disclaimed 
establishment, the Member State in which the taxpayer resides should include the income that 
would otherwise be allocated to the permanent establishment. 132 
 
In the new European Directive are addressed only those cases where there is a substantial risk 
of tax avoidance through hybrid mismatches The misalignments that in particular derive from 
the hybrid nature of the entities should be addressed only if one of the associated companies 
has at least effective control over the other associated companies. Consequently, in such cases 
it should be required that an associated company be owned or held by the contributing 
company or another associated company through participation in terms of voting rights, 
ownership of capital or title to receive profits of at least 50%. To apply this requirement, the 
ownership or rights of the people acting jointly should be aggregated. 133 
 
 
                                                 
132 Considerando n.10 della Direttiva (UE) 2017/952 del Consiglio del 29 maggio 2017; 
 
133 Considerando n.13 della Direttiva (UE) 2017/952 del Consiglio del 29 maggio 2017; 
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4.3 - Hybrid Mismatches through the Legislative Decree November 29 2018 n. 142 
 
 
The new European Directive (EU) 2017/952 May 29th 2017 has focused mainly, and therefore 
deeply) on hybrids mismatches. Compared to the previous Directive (EU) 2016/1164, the 
concept of hybrids mismatches has not only been described more precisely, but has become 
the scope of the new directive. Especially thanks to the enactment of Legislative Decree 29 
November 2018 n. 142, we tried to clarify the issue of hybrid mismatches, but not only that. 
By means of the precise analysis of several articles of the aforementioned Decree, we will 
describe what are called "Hybrid Mismatches" through the Italian Legislative Decree. 
 
Article 6 of the new Decree provides some crucial definitions for the description and 
application of the anti-hybrid provisions. 
In letter a) of paragraph 1, art. 6, the new directive provides a definition of the term 
"mismatch" as a result of a double deduction or a deduction without inclusion. In this 
Legislative Decree are highlighted some definitions, not present in the European Directive 
2016/1164, which I believe will be fundamental to report in order to understand the topic of 
hybrid mismatches, but also to contextualize all the changes made by the European Directive 
(EU) 2017/952 of May 29th 2017. 
 
The concept of "deduction" defined by letter d) is the amount considered deductible for 
income tax purposes in accordance with the laws of the payer's or investor's jurisdiction, 
while the "inclusion", letter e) of the decree it is defined as the amount taken into account for 
the calculation of taxable income according to the laws of the beneficiary's jurisdiction. A 
payment, i.e. a financial instrument, is not considered included, to the extent that the payment 
is eligible for tax relief, only for the way in which the payment is qualified under the laws of 
the beneficiary's jurisdiction. 134 Tax relief, letter f) of the aforementioned decree, is intended 
as an exemption from taxes or a reduction in the tax rate or any tax credit or refund. 
 
The Hybrids mismatch, object of this directive for which the anti-hybrid rules are applied, is 
expressed by a fiscal effect that can be expressed in two different ways: 
 the double deduction, letter b, a deduction of the same negative income component in 
the jurisdiction in which it is claimed or claimed to be, i.e. the jurisdiction of the 
                                                 
134 Article 6, letter e), DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 29 novembre 2018, n. 142; 
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payer, and in another jurisdiction, i.e. the jurisdiction of the investor. In the case of a 
payment by a hybrid entity or a permanent establishment, the jurisdiction of the payer 
is the jurisdiction in which the hybrid entity or permanent establishment is established 
or located; 135  
 the deduction without inclusion, the deduction of a negative income component in any 
jurisdiction in which it is sustained or deemed to be sustained, i.e. the jurisdiction of 
the payer, without the corresponding inclusion, for tax purposes, of the related positive 
income component in the beneficiary's different jurisdiction. The beneficiary's 
jurisdiction is any jurisdiction in which payment (or notional payment) is received or 
deemed to be received under the laws of any other jurisdiction. 136 
 
The anti-hybrid regulations involve the occurrence of a misalignment. This misalignment 
does not emerge in the case of double taxation, which is only theoretical in the abstract, i.e. 
where the deduction, present in both jurisdictions, weighs on a positive component of income 
also found in the two jurisdictions, or where the deduction detected in a jurisdiction indicates 
on an income detected in both jurisdictions involved. Therefore, the concept of "double 
inclusion income" defined by letter g) becomes relevant as any element of income included 
under the laws of both jurisdictions in which the misalignment occurred. 137 
 
The presence of a double-inclusion income of an entity equal to or greater than the relevant 
deduction, excludes in concrete the emergence of the misalignment. If, on the other hand, 
double taxation is lower than the relevant deduction, the misalignment must be reduced 
accordingly. 
The anti-hybrid regulations of the legislation we are studying have the scope of neutralizing 
the phenomena of double deduction or deduction without inclusion. The measures aimed at 
countering these rules do not apply if the tax effect does not emerge or is cancelled by 
spreading over more tax periods. Symmetrically, the anti-hybrid rules are not implemented 
when other regulations of the Italian legal system or of one of the foreign states involved in 
the transaction combat the emergence of the hybrid mismatches avoiding the occurrence of a 
double taxation or deduction without inclusion. The taxable income differences, attributable 
                                                 
135 Article 6, letter b), DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 29 novembre 2018, n. 142; 
 
136 Article 6, letter c), DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 29 novembre 2018, n. 142; 
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to the valuation of the same income component made according to the rules of the individual 
jurisdictions involved, do not create hybrid mismatches. 
With regard to the relevance of the time differences in the imputation of income, the directive 
provides, with reference to the deduction without inclusion, a time threshold that has a 
duration of 12 months from the end of the payer's tax period for those entities who could not 
benefit of the positive income component from the beneficiary's jurisdiction. For this reason, 
within the ATAD 2 Directive, there is the possibility for the taxable person, who has been 
denied the deduction of a negative income component, to obtain recognition providing the 
demonstration of the effective inclusion of the corresponding positive income component in 
the jurisdiction recipient's foreign currency. There may also be the case of a double deduction 
relating to a negative income component, accrued from a permanent establishment abroad, of 
a taxable person under the tax credit regime or by a non-resident subsidiary company for 
which the following option will proportionally include in the tax base, regardless of 
distribution, the income earned by all of its subsidiaries 138 not resident and falling within the 
definition of a company (article 133 TUIR). 139 In this hypothesis, the refusal to recognize the 
negative income component in a specific tax period must be taken into consideration in the 
event that, in one or more subsequent tax periods, this taxable person earns a taxable income 
through his own permanent establishment or non-resident subsidiary company for which the 
option discussed previously was exercised. 140 This compulsion to impose the income would 
be too penalizing for the taxable person and would run counter to the purposes of the 
Legislative Decree and the European Directive. 
 
Therefore, the solution was to exclude from taxation the income earned by the permanent 
establishment or from the foreign subsidiary up to the amount of the negative income 
component whose deduction was denied due to the application of the provisions of the decree. 
 
Crucial for understanding the anti-hybrid provisions are the concepts of the “Person” who is 
defined as "an individual or an entity" and the entity, which in the fiscal perspective and it 
also detected as an “autonomous taxable person” or as “transparent to tax purposes”. The 
                                                 
138 Art 130 TUIR, comma 1. 
 
139 Art 133 TUIR, comma 1: si considerano controllate le società e gli enti di ogni tipo con o senza personalità 
giuridica non residenti nel territorio dello Stato le cui azioni, quote, diritti di voto e di partecipazione agli utili 
sono posseduti direttamente o indirettamente dalla società o ente controllante per una percentuale superiore al 50 
per cento da determinarsi relativamente alla società controllante ed alle società controllate residenti. 
 
140 Art 130 TUIR; 
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concept of entity is defined in letter i) of the Legislative Decree of 29 November 2018 n.142 
as any entity or agreement which, under the legislation of the State, is considered a taxable 
person for the purposes of income taxes and whose positive and negative income components 
are considered positive and negative components of income of another taxable persons under 
the laws of another jurisdiction.141 
 
The list of subjects intended for the anti-hybrid provisions, that is, the subjects called upon to 
apply the aforementioned provisions aimed at neutralizing the misalignment is outlined in 
letter t) of the directive. The letter t) qualifies the taxable person as the companies and entities 
referred to Article 73, paragraph 1, letters a), b) of the TUIR, 142 as well as, the persons 
referred to in letter c) of the same paragraph 1, who are holders of business income, the 
permanent establishments in the territory of the State of companies and entities referred to in 
Article 73 , paragraph 1, letter d), of the TUIR, the companies with the exclusion of simple 
companies and subjects similar to them, as well as physical persons who carry out an 
entrepreneurial activity. 143 
 
Particular attention must be given, with reference to Article 6, letter t), to the scope of 
application of the anti-hybrid provisions, as they are wider than the one envisaged in the 
European Directive. This is due to the inclusion in the group of taxable persons of natural 
persons who carry out a business activity. This extension is based on the fact that the anti-
abuse provisions introduced in the Italian tax system are applied to all business income 
holders (for example, the general anti-abuse rules dictated by Article 10-bis of the Taxpayer's 
Statute and the provisions on CFC, despite the fact that for them too, the ATAD directive 
provides for its application only to IRES subjects). 
 
                                                 
141 Art. 6 lettera i), DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 29 novembre 2018, n. 142,  
 
142 Article 73 TUIR, paragraph 1: Sono soggetti all'imposta sul reddito delle societa': 
a) le societa' per azioni e in accomandita per azioni, le societa' a responsabilita' limitata, le societa' 
cooperative e le societa' di mutua assicurazione, nonche' le societa' europee di cui al regolamento (CE) 
n. 2157/2001 e le societa' cooperative europee di cui al regolamento (CE) n. 1435/2003 residenti nel 
territorio dello Stato; 
b) gli enti pubblici e privati diversi dalle societa', nonche' i trust, residenti nel territorio dello Stato, che 
hanno per oggetto esclusivo o principale l'esercizio di attivita' commerciali; 
c) gli enti pubblici e privati diversi dalle societa', i trust che non hanno per oggetto esclusivo o principale 
l'esercizio di attivita' commerciale nonche' gli organismi di investimento collettivo del risparmio, 
residenti nel territorio dello Stato; 
d) le societa' e gli enti di ogni tipo, compresi i trust, con o senza personalita' giuridica, non residenti nel 
territorio dello Stato. 
 
143 Art. 6 lettera t), DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 29 novembre 2018, n. 142,  
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The operations subject to the contrast rules (anti-hybrid provisions) only concern the hybrid 
mismatches that arise between the head office and permanent establishment or between two or 
more permanent establishments of the same entity, the misalignments arise between the 
taxable person and its associated companies or between associated companies and those 
deriving from a structured agreement involving a taxable person. Transactions between 
associated companies or transactions included in a structured agreement report a critical risk 
of undue reduction of the tax base through hybrids mismatches. 
 
We must therefore provide a precise definition of an associated company in order to continue 
with our study. The definition is broad and includes a) an entity in which the taxable person 
directly or indirectly holds a stake in terms of voting rights or capital ownership equal to or 
greater than 50% or has the right to receive a percentage of the profits of that entity equal to 
or greater than 50%; b) an individual or entity that directly or indirectly holds a stake of 50% 
or more in the assets of a taxable person or has the right to receive a percentage of the tax 
payer's profits equal to or greater than 50%; c) an entity that is part of the same consolidated 
group for the purposes of financial accounting of the taxable person; d) a company in which 
the taxable person exercises a dominant influence over the management pursuant to Article 
2359 of the CC 144; e) a company that exercises a dominant influence over the management of 
the taxable person pursuant to Article 2359 of the CC. 145 
 
The percentage of voting rights or the capital of an entity together with other parties is crucial 
for the purposes of the existence of the control requirement. In the case of hybrids mismatches 
related to financial instruments or hybrids transfers, the relevant threshold for ascertaining the 
existence of control is reduced to 25%. 
The concept of a structured agreement therefore becomes decisive for the description and 
understanding of hybrid mismatches. 
                                                 
144 Articolo 2359 codice civile: Società controllate e società collegate. Sono considerate società controllate:  
1) le società in cui un'altra società dispone della maggioranza dei voti esercitabili nell'assemblea ordinaria;  
2) le società in cui un'altra società dispone di voti sufficienti per esercitare un'influenza dominante nell'assemblea 
ordinaria;  
3) le società che sono sotto influenza dominante di un'altra società in virtù di particolari vincoli contrattuali con 
essa.  
Ai fini dell'applicazione dei numeri 1) e 2) del primo comma si computano anche i voti spettanti a società 
controllate, a società fiduciarie e a persona interposta; non si computano i voti spettanti per conto di terzi.  
Sono considerate collegate le società sulle quali un'altra società esercita un'influenza notevole. L'influenza si 
presume quando nell'assemblea ordinaria può essere esercitato almeno un quinto dei voti ovvero un decimo se la 
società ha azioni quotate in borsa.  
 
145 Art. 6 comma 1, lettera u), DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 29 novembre 2018, n. 142; 
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The structured agreement, letter q) article 6, paragraph 1, is defined as an agreement that 
determines a hybrids mismatch in which the economic impact of the misalignment is assessed 
in negotiating the economic-financial terms of the agreement or aimed at producing a hybrids 
mismatch. This is true except in the event that the taxpayer or an associated company may 
reasonably have not been aware of such misalignment and has not shared the value of the tax 
benefit resulting from the hybrids mismatches. 146 The reasonable awareness of obtaining a 
tax advantage from the taxpayer is sufficient to trigger the application of the anti-hybrid 
provisions of the Decree. In a specular manner, the innocent ignorance of the taxpayer 
obtaining a tax advantage is not sufficient to defuse the application of the law where it has 
nevertheless obtained a benefit from the social advantage. 
 
The time has come to introduce and analyze the letter r) article 6, paragraph 1, which goes to 
describe in detail the concept of hybrids mismatch and the cases that give rise to the tax 
effects that give rise to the aforementioned conflicts. 
The hybrids mismatch is a situation that involves a taxable person in which:  
1. a negative income component, based on the contractual provisions governing a financial 
instrument or a hybrid transfer, generates a deduction without inclusion and jointly: 
1.1. the misalignment is attributable to differences in the qualification of the financial 
instrument or the income component based on the jurisdiction of the payer and that 
other than the beneficiary; 
1.2. the corresponding positive income component is not included by the beneficiary's 
jurisdiction in a tax period that begins within 12 months from the end of the payer's 
tax period with reference to which the negative income component has been 
deducted; 147 
2. a negative component of income sustained or deemed to be incurred based on the 
contractual provisions governing a financial instrument or a hybrid transfer does not 
generate a hybrid mismatch if the tax relief granted in the beneficiary's jurisdiction is due 
exclusively to the tax status of the latter or the fact that the instrument is subject to the 
terms of a special tax regime; 148 
3. a negative income component sustained or deemed to be incurred in favor of a hybrid 
entity generates a deduction effect without inclusion. The misalignment is the result of 
                                                 
146 Art. 6 paragraph 1, lett. q), DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 29 novembre 2018, n. 142; 
 
147 Art. 6 paragraph 1, lett. r), n. 1 DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 29 novembre 2018, n. 142; 
 
148 Art. 6 paragraph 1, lett. r), n. 2 DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 29 novembre 2018, n. 142; 
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differences in the allocation of the corresponding positive income component in favor of 
the hybrid entity under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the hybrid entity is established 
or registered and the laws of the jurisdiction of any person with a stake in that hybrid 
entity. A negative component of income sustained or deemed to be incurred does not lead 
to a mismatch from hybrids if the deduction without inclusion would have occurred in any 
case due to the exemption status of the beneficiary's tax under the laws of its jurisdiction 
of residence or localization; 149 
4. a negative income component sustained or deemed to be sustained in favor of an entity 
having one or more permanent establishments generates a deduction effect without 
inclusion. This misalignment is the result of differences in the allocation of the 
corresponding positive income component under the laws of the jurisdiction of residence 
of the parent company and the laws of the localization jurisdiction of its permanent 
establishment or the laws of the localization jurisdictions of two or more permanent 
organizations of the same entity. In any case, a negative component of income sustained 
or deemed to be incurred does not lead to a hybrids mismatch if the deduction without 
inclusion would have occurred in any case due to the status of exemption from the tax 
payee's law pursuant to the laws of its jurisdiction of residence or location; 150 
5. a negative income component sustained or deemed to be incurred generates a deduction 
effect without inclusion after the attribution of the corresponding positive income 
component in favor of an unknown permanent establishment. A negative income 
component sustained or deemed to be incurred does not lead to an hybrid mismatch if the 
deduction without inclusion would have occurred in any case due to the exemption status 
of the beneficiary's tax under the laws of its jurisdiction of residence or localization; 151 
6. a negative income component sustained or deemed to be incurred by a hybrid entity 
generates a deduction without inclusion. This misalignment arises from the fact that the 
corresponding income component is not recognized as such based on the laws of the 
jurisdiction of the beneficiary. A negative component of income sustained or deemed to 
be incurred does not lead to a hybrid mismatch if the deduction without inclusion would 
have occurred in any case due to the exemption status of the beneficiary's tax under the 
laws of its jurisdiction of residence or localization; 152 
                                                 
149 Art. 6 paragraph 1, lett. r), n. 3 DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 29 novembre 2018, n. 142; 
 
150 Art. 6 paragraph 1, lett. r), n. 4 DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 29 novembre 2018, n. 142. 
 
151 Art. 6 paragraph 1, lett. r), n. 5 DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 29 novembre 2018, n. 142. 
 
152 Art. 6 paragraph 1, lett. r), n. 6 DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 29 novembre 2018, n. 142. 
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7. a negative income component relating to a transaction that is deemed to have taken place 
between the central office and the permanent establishment or between two or more 
permanent establishments generates a deduction without inclusion. This misalignment 
arises from the fact that the corresponding positive income it is not recognized as such 
under the laws of the beneficiary's jurisdiction. The negative component of income 
relating to the notional burden does not lead to an hybrid mismatch if the deduction 
without inclusion would have occurred in any case due to the status of exemption from the 
beneficiary's tax under the laws of its jurisdiction of residence or location; 153 
8. a phenomenon of double taxation of negative income components occurs. 154 
  
The first type listed above (article 6, paragraph 1, letter r), number 1) describes the deduction 
without inclusion originated by financial instruments (i.e. any instrument that gives rise to 
positive income components belonging to a legal financing relationship or an investment of 
capital and subject to taxation according to the corresponding rules regarding the relationships 
of debt, capital or derivatives, according to the laws of the jurisdiction of the beneficiary or 
payer) and by hybrids transfers (i.e. any transfer agreement of a financial instrument in to 
which the underlying yield is considered, for tax purposes, to be obtained simultaneously by 
more than one of the parties of the agreement or whose underlying return is relevant for the 
determination of its remuneration). 155 
 
To ensure that the fiscal misalignment works and the anti-hybrid regulations of the Legislative 
Decree are applied, the misalignment must arise from divergences in the recognition of the 
financial instrument or the payment made for this reason based on the payer's jurisdiction and 
that of the beneficiary. If instead we focus on hybrid transfers, they can give rise to a 
difference in tax treatment if, as a result of a transfer agreement of a financial instrument, the 
underlying return is treated as a derivative. The aforementioned provisions have no effect 
when the tax exemption granted in the beneficiary's jurisdiction is due exclusively to the latter 
tax status or when the financial instrument is subject to the terms of a special tax regime. 
 
To make the above concept more linear it is useful to give some examples. There is the case 
of a financial instrument defined as a debt security in the payer's jurisdiction and as a capital 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
153 Art. 6 paragraph 1, lett. r), n.7 DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 29 novembre 2018, n. 142. 
 
154 Art. 6 paragraph 1, lett. r), n. 8 DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 29 novembre 2018, n. 142. 
 
155 Art. 6 paragraph 1, lett. n), DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 29 novembre 2018, n. 142; 
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security in the jurisdiction of the subscriber (associated company). This difference generates a 
hybrid mismatch (deduction without inclusion) relevant for the purposes of the discipline. 
 In the case of a hybrid transfer, the conclusion of a "repurchase agreement" between 
associated companies can be defined differently for tax purposes based on the jurisdictions of 
the companies involved. The use of different approaches with respect to this transfer 
(formalistic approach linked to the legal ownership of the underlying security and an approach 
based on the economic substance of the transaction) can lead to hybrids mismatches. The 
result can therefore be the presence of a negative income component for the transferor and a 
different qualification of the corresponding positive income component. 
 
We will now proceed with the analysis of the second case (article 6, paragraph 1, letter r), n. 
3). It defines a deduction without inclusion arising from a negative income component 
sustained or deemed to be sustained in favor of a hybrid entity. Therefore, the different 
allocation of this burden in favor of a hybrid entity, based on the laws of the jurisdiction in 
which the hybrid entity is established or registered and the laws of the jurisdiction of any 
other subject with a stake in a hybrid entity, can give life to the phenomenon of deduction 
without imposition. The result is therefore the deduction without inclusion of the interest in 
the various jurisdictions involved. 
Article 6, paragraph 1, letter r), n. 4, lists the cases of deduction without inclusion that arise 
from a negative income component sustained or that is believed to be sustained in favor of an 
entity having one or more permanent establishments. For example, if the positive income 
component is differently attributed by the jurisdiction of the permanent establishment and by 
that resident in the parent company, the positive income component, mirroring the negative 
income component, will not be subject to taxation in both states. 156 
 
Another type of hybrid mismatch is highlighted in Article 6, paragraph 1, letter r), n. 5 of 
Legislative Decree November 29th 2018, n. 142, which explains that the phenomena of 
deduction without inclusion may also occur in the hypothesis of deduction of a negative 
component of income in the jurisdiction of the payer relating to a financial flow attributed to 
an unknown permanent establishment. An unknown permanent establishment is defined as the 
exercise of an activity which, according to the jurisdiction of residence of the taxpayer, 
constitutes a permanent establishment and which, according to the laws of the other 
                                                 
156 SENATO DELLA REPUBBLICA, “Norme contro le pratiche di elusione fiscale (direttiva ATAD 2)”, 
dossier 12 Settembre 2018. 
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jurisdictions, does not constitute a permanent establishment. 157 In this case, the neutralization 
of the misalignment gives the State of the parent company the obligation to include the 
income of the unknown permanent establishment. If in addition the State of residence of the 
parent company is in Italy, it will have to neutralize the hybrid mismatch by applying the tax 
credit system and disregarding the exemption. 
 
Describes the cases of deduction without inclusion that originate from a negative income 
component sustained or that is believed to be sustained by a hybrid entity the article 6, 
paragraph 1, letter r, n. 6. To facilitate understanding I believe it is useful to proceed with an 
example. We can take the case of an entity considered as "opaque" or “transparent” for the 
purposes of its State of tax residence and part of a tax consolidation in that jurisdiction 
corresponds to an interest in favor of its shareholders established in a foreign State that treats 
the company as “transparent”. The interest will represent a negative income component 
relevant for the State of residence of the company that compensates for a non-double 
inclusion income. This deduction will not have to pay any inclusion of the interest to the 
shareholders since their state of belonging does not recognize payments between companies 
and members. 158 
 
As a new type of hybrids mismatch, the n. 7 of the letter r) of the Legislative Decree relates to 
the cases of deduction without inclusion that originate from a negative component of income 
that is believed to be sustained between the parent company and the permanent establishment 
or between two or more permanent establishments. 159 The aforementioned misalignment can 
occur as a result of different allocations of assets (e.g. intellectual property rights) in the 
perspective of the State of residence of the parent company and of the location of the 
permanent establishment or between states of resident of permanent establishment. Given the 
example, this different allocation can be matched by the recognition for tax purposes of a cost 
for the use of this intellectual property right which does not correspond to the related revenue. 
 
The double taxation phenomena just described are not considered entirely illegitimate, there 
are cases in which double taxation is legitimate. An example useful to report is the case in 
                                                 
157 SENATO DELLA REPUBBLICA, “Norme contro le pratiche di elusione fiscale (direttiva ATAD 2)”, 
dossier 12 Settembre 2018. 
 
158 SENATO DELLA REPUBBLICA, “Norme contro le pratiche di elusione fiscale (direttiva ATAD 2)”, 
dossier 12 Settembre 2018. 
 
159 Ibidem. 
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which a negative component of income of the permanent establishment is also recognized in 
the jurisdiction of the parent company. This effect occurs whenever the branch exemption 
option 160 does not operate.  
A branch exemption option is an optional regime introduced with Legislative Decree 
147/2015 which concerns companies under Italian law that have permanent establishments 
(branches) abroad, which makes it possible to exclude from taxation in Italy the losses or 
profits (for IRES and IRAP purposes) produced by all permanent establishments of the Italian 
parent company present abroad, with the exception for the branches present in black list 
countries, whose incomes are ascribed to transparency (procedure envisaged by the CFC 
regulation). 161 
 
This mechanism makes it possible to tax the income produced in the state where the branch is 
located. In the absence of an option, the result of the permanent foreign establishment, both 
positive and negative, is ascribed by transparency to the total income of the parent company 
in its state of residence. 
To avoid double taxation, a credit is assigned for taxation paid in the foreign country where 
the branch is located. 
This option allows, in principle, to make Italian companies that produce and work with stable 
organizations abroad more competitive by eliminating the differences in taxation between 
Italy and the country of the branch, as it is taxed exclusively in the country abroad without 
discounting Italian taxation. 162 
 
Similarly, a positive component of income of the permanent establishment is recognized as 
such also in the jurisdiction of the parent company. For the sake of completeness, I will now 
proceed further describing an example of illegitimate double taxation. The illegitimate double 
taxation occurs when a negative component of income of the permanent establishment is also 
recognized by the jurisdiction of residence of the parent company, but, in the jurisdiction of 
the permanent establishment, it compensates for an income that is not double inclusion (i.e. it 
is not subject to taxation in the State of residence of the parent company). 163 
                                                 
160 Art. 168 ter. of the TUIR, “Esenzione degli utili e delle perdite delle stabili organizzazioni di imprese 
residenti”. 
 
161 SENATO DELLA REPUBBLICA, “Norme contro le pratiche di elusione fiscale (direttiva ATAD 2)”, 
dossier 12 Settembre 2018. 
162 Ibidem. 
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The phenomena of double deduction, which may emerge from the double tax residence of the 
taxable person and from the simultaneous relevance, in the two jurisdictions of tax residence 
of the same income component are also relevant. 
Article 7 of Legislative Decree November 29th 2018, n. 142 provides a precise definition of 
jurisdiction that is worth reporting. The article identifies precisely the role of the Italian State 
in relation to the possible following scenarios: 
1. The Italian state is the State of the payer if the negative component of income is 
deductible for the purposes of determining the taxable income of a taxable person. 
2. The Italian state is the State of the investor if the negative component of income 
sustained, or that is deemed to be supported, by a permanent establishment of a 
taxable person or by a non-resident subject is attributed to a taxable person and is 
deductible to the purposes of determining its taxable income. 
3. The Italian state is the State of the beneficiary if the positive component of income is 
attributed to a taxable person based on the jurisdiction of the payer. 164 
 
After having dealt with the main features and the fundamental notions outlined in the 
Legislative Decree November 29th 2018, n. 142, we must now introduce the focus of the 
discussion. Article 8 of the aforementioned Decree has set itself the scope of analyzing the 
phenomenon of hybrids mismatch in detail, providing useful examples to understand the 
concept.  
I consider it crucial to reproduce the whole article 8 and its related paragraphs and then 
proceed to the detailed analysis of the same. 
1. To the extent that a hybrid mismatch leads to a double deduction, the deduction of the 
negative income component is denied to the taxable person if the Italian State is the 
State of the investor or if it is the State of the payer and the deduction of the negative 
income component is not denied in the State of the investor. The non-deductibility in 
the State of the investor must result from a declaration issued by the taxpayer residing 
there or localized or from other certain and precise elements.  
2. To the extent that a hybrid mismatch results in a deduction without inclusion: 
a. if the Italian State is the State of the payer, the deduction of the negative 
income component is denied to the taxable person, unless the misalignment is 
neutralized in another State. The inclusion in the State of the parent company 
                                                                                                                                                        
163 SENATO DELLA REPUBBLICA, “Norme contro le pratiche di elusione fiscale (direttiva ATAD 2)”, 
dossier 12 Settembre 2018.  
 
164 Art. 7 del DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 29 novembre 2018, n. 142; 
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or in the State of localization of the permanent establishment must result from 
a declaration issued by the tax payer residing there or localized or from other 
certain and precise elements; 
b. if the Italian State is the State of the beneficiary and the deduction of the 
negative income component is not denied in the State of the payer, the amount 
of the corresponding positive income component that would otherwise 
generate a misalignment is taxable for the taxable person, unless the 
misalignment is not neutralized in another state. The non-deductibility in the 
State of the payer or the inclusion in the localization of the permanent 
establishment of the taxable person must result from a declaration issued by 
the tax payer residing there or localized or from other certain and precise 
elements; 
c. if the deduction of a negative income component has been denied to a taxable 
person pursuant to letter a), the subsequent inclusion, in the foreign State of 
residence or location of the beneficiary, of the corresponding positive 
component in his taxable income, in a tax period that begins beyond 12 months 
from the end of the taxable period of the taxable person with reference to 
which the deduction has been denied, gives rise to the right to the 
corresponding deduction of the negative income component previously not 
deduced.  
3. The deduction of a negative income component from a taxable person is not permitted 
to the extent that it finances, directly or indirectly, deductible charges that generate a 
hybrid mismatch through a transaction or series of transactions between associated 
companies or part of a structured agreement. Notwithstanding what was reported in 
the previous period, the negative income component sustained or deemed to be 
supported by a taxable person is deductible if and to the extent that one of the States of 
residence or location of the parties involved in the transaction or series of transactions 
have made an equivalent adjustment with the effect of neutralizing the hybrid 
mismatches in question.  
4. To the extent that a hybrid mismatch involves an income of a permanent establishment 
that is not known to a taxable resident, that income is taxable to the latter. The 
previous period does not apply if the provisions of a convention to avoid double 
taxation between the Italian State and a third country provide for the obligation to 
exempt the income. 
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5. In the case of the terms referred to in letters g-bis) and g-ter) of paragraph 1 of article 
44 TUIR, 165 as well as of transactions that produce similar economic effects, having 
as their object bonds and similar securities or atypical securities, the credit for foreign 
taxes is due in an amount corresponding to the positive difference between the income 
to which the said credit is linked and the financial charge relating to the 
aforementioned transactions. 166 
 
A more in-depth analysis of this article can be highlighted in the following part. In paragraph 
1 of the same article, in the case of the actual presence of double deduction in the context of 
an agreement between associated parties or in the case of a structured agreement, the denial of 
the deduction by the taxable person is envisaged that qualifies as an investor, or, in the event 
that the taxable person is the payer, the denial of the deduction by that taxable person. 
Paragraph 2, on the other hand, provides for the repudiation of the deduction for the payable 
payer 167 or, in the event that the taxable person is the beneficiary, for the inclusion of the 
positive income component in the taxable base of the taxable person, 168 only in the 
eventuality of the actual presence of a deduction effect without inclusion in terms of 
agreement between associated parties or in the context of a structured agreement. 
Some types of misalignments defined as imported misalignments, i.e. those that shift the 
effect of a hybrid mismatch between parts in third countries to the Italian State through the 
use of a non-hybrid instrument involving a taxable person, are the subject of the article 8, 
paragraph 3. The mentioned article disown the deduction of the positive income component 
relevant for the taxable person involved in the transaction. It finds application only if a hybrid 
mismatch actually emerges. 
Paragraph 4 of Article 8 provides for a measure that involves an income of an unknown 
permanent establishment of a resident taxable person. As regards the taxable income, it is the 
responsibility of the taxable person. 
Finally, to conclude the analysis of Article 8 on the subject of hybrid mismatches, we analyze 
paragraph 5, which provides for an arrangement aimed at reducing the tax credit in a way 
                                                 
165 Art. 44, TUIR, Redditi di Capital: g-bis) i proventi derivanti da riporti e pronti contro termine su titoli e 
valute; g-ter) i proventi derivanti dal mutuo di titoli garantito; 
 
166 Art. 8, DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 29 novembre 2018, n. 142; 
 
167 Art. 8, paragraph 2, lett. a), DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 29 novembre 2018, n. 142; 
 
168 Art. 8, paragraph 2, lett. b), DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 29 novembre 2018, n. 142; 
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corresponding to the taxable net income of the specific transaction that leads to the occurrence 
of a foreign tax credit. 
Speaking of mismatches, we can find then, in the Legislative Decree, articles 9 and 10 that 
define the inverse hybrid mismatches and the misalignments from tax residence. They are 
particular types of misalignment which specify, in the case of Article 9, 169 cases of deduction 
without inclusion deriving from the allocation of positive income components to entities 
considered transparent for the purposes of the law of the State in which the entity is located 
and opaque for the purposes of the law of the State of location of the subjects who hold a 
significant interest in the entity. This case, however, should no longer occur because, as a 
result of tax provisions, the income of the transparent company is imputed to their members 
and it is subject to taxation as the participation income. It is therefore legitimate to expect the 
effective inclusion of the income of the hybrid entity for income tax purposes. 
Regarding the article 10, it governs measures to combat double deduction phenomena 
deriving from cases of double tax residence. This article is of fundamental importance as this 
shortcut is often used by corporate groups to circumvent the taxation of the parent company 
and the jurisdiction of the permanent establishment. For a completeness factor, I consider it 
necessary to report the text of the article, present in the Legislative Decree, and comment it 
later. 
Article 10 of Legislative Decree 29 November 2018, n. 142 consists of three paragraphs that 
specify that: 
1. A negative income component, supported by a taxable person who is also resident for 
tax purposes in another EU Member State on the basis of the internal law of that State 
and is considered therein resident for the purposes of the agreement to avoid double 
existing taxes between the Italian State and that State are not deductible if this 
negative income component is considered deductible in the foreign State and the 
deduction is not offset therein by a double inclusion income. The provision of the 
previous period applies as long as the mismatch is not neutralized by the other State. 
2. A negative income component, bear by a taxable person who is also a resident for tax 
purposes in a country not belonging to the European Union, is not deductible if this 
negative income component is considered deductible in the third country and the 
deduction is not compensated by a double inclusion income. The provision in the 
previous period applies as long as the misalignment is not neutralized by the third 
country. 
                                                 
169 Art. 9, DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 29 novembre 2018, n. 142; 
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3. If the deduction of a negative income component has been denied to a taxable person 
pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 and the same results in a positive double-inclusion 
income component in a subsequent tax period, the latter is excluded from taxation up 
to the amount of the negative component of income whose deduction was denied 
pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2. 170 
Breaking down the aforementioned article 10, we can see how, in the case of a company or 
entities that are fiscally resident, it is considered resident for tax purposes also in another 
Member State of the European Union based on the internal law of that State, the deduction 
negative component must be disregarded for the purposes of corporate income taxes. 
In the event that the Italian State is the State of tax residence for the purposes of the 
agreement to avoid double taxation, the measure of contrast provided for by the Legislative 
Decree does not operate and the task of neutralizing the hybrids mismatches will be entrusted 
to the foreign State. 
If instead the mismatch involves a non-EU state, the deduction of the negative component 
must be disregarded for the purposes of income taxes. 
 
4.4 - Hybrid Instruments and Hybrid Entities 
 
 
After describing in details the concept of hybrid mismatches through the two European 
Directive and the Legislative Decree, the following paragraphs will have to aim to analyze 
two important and critical “actors” of hybrid mismatches.  
The hybrid mismatch arrangements can be divided into the following two categories based on 
the particular hybrid technique that produces the tax outcome: 
Hybrid instruments exploit a conflict in the tax treatment of an instrument in two or more 
countries. These arrangements can use: 
 Hybrid financial instruments, under which taxpayers take mutually incompatible 
positions regarding the treatment of the same payment under the instrument; 
 Hybrid transfers, under which taxpayers take mutually incompatible positions 
regarding who has the ownership rights of an asset; 
 Substitute payments, under which a taxable payment in effect becomes non-taxable by 
virtue of a transfer of the instrument giving rise to it. 171 
                                                 
170 Art. 10, DECRETO LEGISLATIVO 29 novembre 2018, n. 142; 
171 OECD/G20, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, “Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements”, 
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Hybrid entities exploit a difference in the tax treatment of an entity in two or more countries 
(generally a conflict between transparency and opacity). 172 
 
4.4.1 - Hybrid Financial Instruments 
 
 
Hybrid instruments are typically instruments treated as debt in one country and as equity in 
another. To be more specific a hybrid financial instrument is defined as a financial instrument 
that is considered debt in country A where a payment on the instrument is tax deductible, 
while in country B the instrument is treated as equity and the proceeds constitute a tax-exempt 
dividend. The taxation of hybrid instruments became of massive importance as it created 
possibilities for development of schemes inside cross-border groups, which are somewhere in 
between of tax avoidance and tax evasion. 173 The critical issue arises from the complexity of 
these instruments, having both equity and debt features. Definition and classification of 
hybrid instruments varies from different studies, but we can say that are instruments that can 
combine elements of equity and debt. Emerson in his study gives a full list of different types 
of hybrid financial instruments. 174 These combinations of features is critical to understand the 
aim of these instruments. Both equity and debt are source of financing business, but the first 
one is connected to ownership and the second is not. This specific difference is the result of 
different ways of treatment of related income or expense by income tax, so in the case of 
hybrid instruments we have inevitably issues in taxation as classification of instruments could 
implicit differ in tax regime. To be completely clear, all legislation separate taxation of 
dividends and interest. Taxation of dividends and interest is associated with a certain set of 
tax mechanism; particularly double taxation avoiding, participation exemptions, withholding 
tax, taxable income, deductible expenses, thin capitalization rule. Part of these mechanisms 
have the aim of protecting the country of resident from profit transfer to other countries or tax 
evasion, another part is oriented to provide tax benefits for local businesses or foreign context. 
In case of hybrid financial instruments, another important issue is accounting standards. Many 
countries have their own, local GAAP, which more or less are in line and do not differ too 
much from IAS/IFRS for the most simple everyday transactions, but could have important 
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differences in case of more complicated issues, including accounting of hybrid instruments. 
175 Local accounting principles are important for taxation of hybrid instruments, as reporting 
usually is connected to financial reporting, for example in case of income recognition.  
The difficulties in understanding deeply the meaning and the use of these hybrid instruments, 
differences in financial reporting and taxation among countries are the main causes for tax 
avoidance and evasion. 
 
In most of the cases, taxation of dividends and interest is well regulated. The main problem 
with taxation of dividends is of economic nature. 176 It is widely recognized that double 
taxation, for example as source of taxation in country resident and as income in country 
receiving dividends cannot be accepted from an economic point of view, as the same profit 
will be taxed twice. Therefore some additional mechanisms were developed; namely the 
mechanism of participation exemption. The participation exemption is a mechanism where, 
under certain criteria usually a level of control and period of investment held taxation of 
dividends is eliminated. The participation exemption mechanism is one of the most important 
mechanisms ensuring free capital movement in cross-border structures. 177 
Taxation of interest also has a sound economic background. 178 It is recognized that needs of 
business development create demand in financing sources, so interest is considered as regular 
business expense and therefore should be tax deductible. 
Mentioning the general principles of taxation of dividends, interest in fact became classic 
theoretical cornerstones of economics, finance and taxation. In practice, many distortions in 
applications of these principles became obvious, as there are still big differences in tax rates 
and tax regulations among countries worldwide. Reaction to such distortions was the 
development of additional protective taxation mechanisms as withholding tax and thin 
capitalization rule.  
The main goal of withholding tax and the thin capitalization rule is to protect the country 
resident from transfer of profit trough interest to other jurisdictions by reducing taxation of 
profit in the resident country. 179 
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Combination of general principles of taxation with protective tax mechanism created a very 
complicated multilayer taxation structure, in which the resident country for some other 
legislations recognizes interest exemption and for others does not, or for some countries 
applies withholding tax and for others does not. The overall picture becomes even more 
complicated because of the application of cross-border double taxation avoiding treaties. 180 
The development of hybrid instruments made cross-border taxation system even more 
complicated. 181 It is agreed that hybrid instruments have features both of equity and debt. 182 
This simple fact theoretically creates some additional distortion to the taxation system as 
proceeds from the same instrument could be dividends on interest. 183 Current practice of 
hybrid instruments developed such complicated structures184 that sometimes the board of 
experts expires difficulties in their recognition and proper classification. If we put hybrid 
instruments in a multilayer taxation system briefly described above, there is a possibility that, 
from the same hybrid instruments in one country can be recognized as dividends and as 
interest in another one. 185 As approaches for taxation of dividends or interests are different, 
conflict in recognition may result in additional benefits for cross-border structure using such 
instruments. 
The most controversial scenario in case of hybrid instrument in cross-border structure will 
arise when in one country it is recognized as pure debt and in another as pure equity. 186 If 
there is no withholding tax between countries and the participation exemption mechanism 
exists in the resident country, proceeds from hybrid instrument could be treated as interest and 
therefore are fully tax deductible and in another country proceeds could be treated as 
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dividends and are non-taxable income. 187 Under such scenario, cross border structure will 
receive additional benefits, as income the tax required to be paid in the resident country will 
be lower. 
The paradox of such a controversial scenario is a requirement of rather developed taxation 
system with free cross border flows of capital, which are mostly features of well-developed 
economies. 188 The condition sine qua non of these instruments are an exemption from work 
participation and an absence of withholding tax. Bilateral or multilateral international treaties 
can usually create these preconditions. Another important precondition is the existence of 
differences in recognition of hybrid instruments by local GAAP that is still quite often a 
feature of well-developed economies.189 In case of less developed economies, the possibility 
of such a scenario is very low because of application of withholding tax and even double 
taxation of profit. As a conclusion, the problems with taxation of hybrid instruments could be 
detected as a non-positive side effect of efforts to guarantee non-payment cross-border export 
and import of capital. 
 
While hybrid financial instruments may combine characteristics of debt and equity in any 
number of ways, tax systems generally categorize all such instruments as either debt or 
equity. Just as tax rules vary between countries in other respects, there is considerable 
variation in the rules that demarcate debt and equity. In the US, for example, the demarcation 
rules takes into account many different characteristics of the instrument, for instance whether 
it has fixed maturity, whether its return  represents a legally enforceable claim, whether such a 
claim is subordinate to the claims of general creditors, and whether its holder has voting 
rights. 190 In other countries, demarcation rules are completely different. Under Dutch tax law, 
remuneration for debt (interest) is generally deductible, while remuneration for equity (profit 
distribution) is not deductible. Both interest and profit distributions are taxable in the hands of 
the recipient. Dutch corporate tax law provides for an exemption, by means of the 
participation exemption (deelnemingsvrijstelling), of income derived from equity investments 
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in a subsidiary if a shareholder owns at least 5% of the nominal paid-in share capital in the 
subsidiary and if the shares are not held as a portfolio investment. 191 In France, for instance, 
the classification of a financial instrument as debt or equity depends solely on whether voting 
rights are conferred on the holder or not. 192 
Because of such differences in the categorization of these hybrid instruments the possibility 
that the same financial instruments is categorized as debt in one country and equity in another 
country has been considered. For instance, a perpetual loan is treated as equity in some 
countries with reference to the equity-like characteristics that the principal is never 
reimbursed and as debt is other countries with reference to the debt-like characteristics that 
holders have no voting tights and do not fully share the risk of the business venture. Such 
cross-border hybrid instruments represent an important tax planning opportunity for 
multinational firms. 193  
To actually take a look of what we are discussing we should consider a firm that invests in a 
foreign subsidiary with a hybrid instrument treated as debt in the host country and equity in 
the home country. The payment on the instrument is treated as tax-deductible interest 
expenses in the host country and equity in the home country. 194 
Quantifying the use of cross-border hybrid instruments is extremely challenging because the 
tax treatment of financial instruments cannot be inferred from financial statements. Evidence 
however suggests that cross-border hybrid instruments are widely used and have contributed 
significantly to the decline in effective tax rates on cross-border investment. 195 
The feasibility of tax-avoidance with cross-border hybrid instruments can be measured with a 
method than will be analyze as follows. At the hearth of this analysis there is a simple model 
of hybrid instruments and their classification for tax purposes. The model posits that 
demarcation rules have two components: an assessment function that translates the 
characteristics of financial instruments into a measure of equityness and a threshold level of 
equityness. Hybrid instruments with a level of equityness above the threshold are treated as 
equity; those with a level of equityness below the threshold are treated as debt. To understand 
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how the model works, consider a perpetual loan that combines the equity-like characteristic 
that the principal is never reimbursed and the debt-like characteristic that the holder has no 
voting rights. If the assessment function puts a large weight on the maturity-dimension of 
financial instruments, the perpetual loan is considered relatively equity-like; if the assessment 
function puts a large weight on the voting-dimension, it is considered relatively debt-like. 196 
Whether the perpetual loan is ultimately treated as debt or equity for tax purposes depends 
both on weights of the assessment function and the threshold. 
Equipped with this model, the mandatory question is the following: under what conditions can 
firms finance foreign investment with an instrument that is treated as equity in the home 
country and debt in the host country? We find that for a given pair of countries with different 
demarcation rules, this type of tax avoidance is always feasible for firms in one of the 
countries and, provided that the assessment functions differ sufficiently between the two 
countries, it is feasible for firms in both countries. To see the intuition for this result, 
reconsider the U.S. tax rules that take into account many different characteristics to determine 
whether an instrument is debt or equity and the French tax rules that only take into account a 
single characteristic, voting rights. 197 If a U.S. firm finances an investment in France with an 
instrument that is equity-like in all dimensions except that it does not confer voting rights on 
the holder, the instrument is likely to be considered equity in the U.S. and debt in France. If, 
on the other hand, a French firm finances an investment in the U.S. with an instrument that is 
debt-like in all dimensions except that it confers voting rights on the holder, the instrument is 
likely to be considered debt in the U.S. and equity in France. Hence, in this example tax 
avoidance is feasible for U.S. firms investing in France as well as for French firms investing 
in the U.S. Clearly, the scope for avoidance derives from the two countries emphasizing 
different attributes of financial instruments when assessing their equityness. 
 
This part will show and study why hybrid instruments may be an attractive tool for tax 
avoidance. Niels Johannesen, professor of the University of Copenhagen, in the Journal of 
Public Economics published an article, “Tax avoidance with cross-border hybrid 
instruments”, 198 in which he developed a model that can be utilized to classify hybrid 
financial instruments to understand when tax avoidance with hybrids is feasible and how to 
treat hybrid instruments. Consider a firm investing in a foreign subsidiary and assume that the 
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home country operates a territorial tax system. If the investment is financed with equity, there 
is no tax deduction for payments on the instrument in the host country and no taxation in the 
home country. If the investment is instead financed with a loan (debt), the payments are tax 
deductible in the host country and taxable in the home country. To treat hybrid financial 
instruments, a dimension, an environment, must be set. An example of this dimension can be 
maturity: debt can have maturity of a day, a year or 100 years whereas instruments such as 
perpetual debt and standard equity never mature. Another example can be voting rights: in 
many cases all shares carry the same number of votes, but it is perfectly possible to endow 
shares with extra voting rights (e.g. Class A shares) or very limited voting rights (e.g. Class B 
Shares). Another example of dimension can be the return, which may be predetermined as in 
the case with a fixed interest rate loan or, to some extent, it depends on firm profits as in the 
case with a profit sharing loan and a loan that can be converted into equity by the holders.  
Tax systems generally treat all financial instruments as either debt or equity and therefore 
include a rule that assign hybrid instruments to one of these categories. We posit that such a 
demarcation rule consists of two elements: a continuous and differentiable assessment 
function F(z), which assigns a value to each vector z that reflects the position of the 
instrument on the debt-equity continuum, and a threshold level of equityness y. Under the 
demarcation rule {F(∙);y}, an instrument z is categorized as debt if F(z)<y and as equity if 
F(z)≥y. Mirroring real-world corporate tax systems, demarcation rules thus classify any 
financial instrument as either debt or equity. 199 
It is useful for the comprehension to see particular examples of the hybrid financial 
instruments. We highlighted four cases of different instruments practice.  
 
Starting from the figure 3 a), it provides an illustration of a demarcation rule in the two-
dimensional case. The shaded light blue square represents the full set of financial instruments 
ℤ. The demarcation line depicts the subset of financial instruments. This is the set of marginal 
hybrid instruments with characteristics that are just sufficiently close to equity to be 
categorized as such by the demarcation rule. The slope of the demarcation line is negative 
reflecting that an increase in the equityness of a financial instrument in one dimension 
requires a reduction in the equityness in the other dimension to keep the overall level of 
equityness of the instrument constant. 
We must say that, obviously, this model of hybrid financial instruments and demarcation rule 
is a stylized representation of reality. In the real world, the demarcation rules do not exist in 
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mathematical form, but are laid down on laws, regulation and jurisdiction that do not describe 
precisely the tax treatment of any financial instruments. 
 
 
Fig. 4: Cross-border Hybrid Financial Instrument Treatment 
 
This model, however, is still useful for understanding the tax treatment of hybrids. If, as 
example, identical hybrids tend to receive the same tax treatment either because the tax rules 
are so detailed that the correct tax treatment of an hybrid can be inferred with a little 
uncertainty or because the discretion of tax authorities and courts is constrained by previous 
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decisions, then our framework appears to be appropriate and the demarcation rule could be 
estimated using information about the actual tax treatment of different hybrids. On the other 
hand, if the tax treatment of hybrids depends on random factors, then the framework is less 
appropriate.  200 
Coming back the Figure 3, there are different examples of cross-border hybrid instruments. 
Letter b), cross-border in two directions shows the demarcation line of two countries. The two 
demarcation lines detect four kinds of hybrids financial instruments. Two of these are related 
to the letter a), ℤDD where D refers to debt and ℤEE where E refers to equity, which detect 
the same treatment for the instruments. Both countries treat the hybrid financial instrument in 
the same way, all debt of all equity. ℤDE and ℤED describe that cases in which the two 
countries treat the same hybrid financial instruments in different ways. The former implies 
debt treatment in country A and equity treatment in country B, and the latter implies equity 
treatment in country A and debt treatment in country B.  
Letter c), shows the demarcation line of two countries and the lines define three subset of 
hybrid financial instruments. ℤDD and ℤEE imply that both countries treat the instruments as 
all debt or all equity. ℤED instead implies equity treatment in country A and debt treatment in 
county B, whereas there are no cases of hybrid financial instrument for which there is a debt 
treatment in county A and an equity in county B (ℤDE). 
Finally, letter d), shows the same demarcation lines of two countries, as shown in the other 
cases, but this time the two lines have the same slope, which means that are parallel and are 
going in one single direction. The figure 3 d) looks quite similar to letter c) in which ℤED 
implies equity treatment in country A and debt treatment in country B whereas vanishes ℤDE. 
These examples suggest that, for a given pair of countries, it is generally possible to construct 
cross-border hybrids in one direction, either an instrument treated as equity in A and debt in B 
or an instrument treated as equity in B and debt in A. 201  Instead, depending on the properties 
of the demarcation rules, it may or may not be possible to construct cross-border hybrids in 
both directions, i.e. an instrument treated as equity in A and debt in B and an instrument 
treated as equity in B and debt in A. Moreover, the examples point to particular features of 
demarcation rules that appear to facilitate the use of cross-border hybrids.  
Specifically, the examples suggest that more similar threshold values and less similar weights 
in the assessment functions make it more likely that cross-border hybrids exist in both 
directions. The inherent complexity around the hybrid financial instruments, as inferred from 
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the examples above, is due to the country-specific tax environment. This point is of particular 
relevance upon the introduction of an effective solution that can identify all the specificities of 
the hybrid instruments. 202 
 
4.4.2 - Hybrid Transfer 
 
 
Hybrid transfer, as per OECD BEPS Action 2 definition, are a particular type of collateralized 
loans arrangements or derivative transaction where the counterparties to the same 
arrangement in different jurisdictions both treat themselves as the owner of the loan collateral 
or subject matter of the derivative. 203 A hybrid transfer is designed to produce withholding 
tax relief for more than one of the parties involved.  Therefore, the taxpayer Member State 
shall limit the relief proportion to the net table income regarding the payment. 
The most common transaction used to achieve mismatch in tax outcomes under a hybrid 
transfer is a sale and repurchase agreement (generally referred as “repo”) over an asset where 
the terms of the repo make it the economic equivalent of a loan. The repo results in one 
jurisdiction treating the arrangement in accordance with its form (a sale and a repurchase of 
the asset) while the counterparty jurisdiction taxes the arrangement in accordance with its 
economic substance (a loan with the asset serving as collateral). 204 While the collateral for 
these arrangements often involves shares of controlled entities, the same repo technique can 
be used with virtually any asset that generates an excluded or exempt return or some other tax 
relief under the laws of both jurisdiction. 205  
Pictured below, there is an example of collateralized repurchase agreement. The structure 
illustrated in Fig. 4 involves a company in Country A (A Co) which owns a subsidiary B (B 
Sub). A sells to shares of B Sub (or a class of shares in B Sub) to B Co under an agreement 
that A Co will acquire those shares at a future date for an agreed price. Between sale and 
repurchase, B Sub earns income, pays taxes and makes distributions on the share to B Co.  
Country B, on one hand, taxes the arrangements in accordance with its form. Accordingly B 
Co is treated as the owner of the B Sub shares and entitled to receive and retain the dividends 
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paid by B Sub during the life of the repo. Country B will typically grant a credit, exclusion, 
exemption or some other tax relief to B Co on the dividends received. B Co also treats the 
transfer of the shares back to A Co as a genuine sale of shares and may exempt any gain on 
disposal under an equity participation exemption or a general exclusion for capital gains. 
 
 
Fig. 5: Collateralized Loan Repo 206 
 
Country A, on the other hand, taxes the arrangement in accordance with its economic 
substance. For Country A tax purposes:  
a) The transaction is treated as a loan by B Co to A Co that is secured through B Co’s 
holding of the B Sub shares. A Co is thus regarded as being the owner of the B Sub 
shares with the corresponding entitlement to B Sub dividends during the life of the 
repo. 
b) Since Country A treats A Co as the owner of B Sub shares, it requires A Co to include 
the amount of any dividends paid by B Sub to B Co in A Co’s income. However. a 
credit exclusion or other tax relief applicable to those dividends will generally shelter 
the income tax on this dividend under the laws of Country A.  
c) The net cost of the repo to A Co is treated as a deductible financing cost. This cost 
includes the dividends treated as economically derived by A Co that are paid to and 
retained by B Co from B Sub but which, for Country A purposes, are treated as paid 
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by A Co to B Co during the life of the repo. Because Country A treats A Co as having 
paid the amount of the dividend across to B Co, Country A grants a deduction for the 
amount of the dividend paid to and retained by B Co. 
 
The net effect of this repo transaction can be illustrated below. Assume B Sub is a company 
that is tax resident in Country B and A Co sells the shares to B Co under a repo. The 
simplified calculation below assumes that B Sub holds assets worth $1,000 which generate a 
10% return and that both Country A and Country B have a 30% tax rate. 
 
 
Table 3: Repo accounting treatment 207 
 
As illustrated in the table above, B Sub earns income of $100 and pays $30 of Country B 
income taxes. It then pays a dividend of $70 to B Co. A Co includes a total dividend of $100 
in its taxable income (including an indirect tax credit of $30) but is able to claim a deduction 
of $70 for the financing expense paid to B Co. As a result, A Co has net taxable income of 
$30 and a total Country A tax liability of $9. A Co can, however, use the underlying tax credit 
to eliminate this liability and still be left with a further $21 of surplus credits to offset against 
tax on other income. 
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4.4.3 - Substitute Payments 
 
 
A substitute payment is any payment, made under an arrangement to transfer a financial 
instrument, to the extent it includes, or is a payment of an amount representing a financing or 
equity return on the underlying financial instrument where the payment or return would:  
 not have been included in ordinary income of the payer; 
 have been included in ordinary income of the payee; or  
 have given rise to hybrid mismatch; 
if it had been made directly under the financial instrument. 208 
Substitute payments are transfers of financial instruments where the payment of a financing or 
equity return under that asset transfer gives rise to a D/NI outcome that has the effect of 
undermining the integrity of the hybrid financial instrument rules. The transfer will have this 
effect where: 
a) the transferor secures a better tax outcome on the payment under the asset transfer than 
it would have obtained if it had held onto the underlying instrument; 
b) the transferee treats the payment under the asset transfer as deductible while the return 
on the underlying instrument will be treated as exempt or excluded from income;  
c) the transfer has the effect of taking instrument outside of the scope of the hybrid 
financial instrument rule. 
 
The substitute payments rule neutralizes any D/NI outcome in respect of the payment of a 
financing or equity return under asset transfer agreement when the transfer of the underlying 
financial instrument would give rise to one of the above outcomes. 
Under this rule a taxpayer that buys a financial instrument for a consideration that includes a 
financing or equity return, will be denied a deduction for the payment if: that return would 
have been included in ordinary income of the payee or would not have been included in 
ordinary income of the payer or would have given rise to hybrid mismatch if it had been made 
directly under the financial instrument. 
 
The substitute payment rules apply to any type of D/NI outcome (regardless of whether such 
outcome is attributable to the terms of the instrument, the tax status of the parties or the 
context in which the asset is held). The rule is, however, confined to payments that give rise 
to a financing or equity return in respect of the underlying instrument. It would not ordinarily 
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apply, for example, to a payment made to settle a claim for a breach of warranty under an 
asset sale agreement. 
 
D/NI outcomes, in respect of substitute payment, refer to the substitute payment rules that is 
applied to any actual mismatch in tax outcomes, regardless of the circumstances in which the 
deduction arises. This include any amount taken into account in calculating the gain or loss on 
disposal of a trading asset.  
 
Substitute payments are arrangements involving the transfer of financial instruments where a 
payment is made in substitution for the financing or equity return on the transferred asset and 
differences between the tax treatment of that payment and the underlying return on the 
instrument have the net-effect of undermining the integrity of the hybrid financial instrument 
rule. 209 
A substitute payment that gives rise to a D/NI outcome will be subject to adjustment under the 
hybrid financial instrument rule if the underlying financing or equity return on the transferred 
asset would otherwise have been taxable in the hands of the transferor or is treated as exempt 
or excluded from income in the hands of the transferee or if the transfer has the effect of 
taking financial instrument outside of the scope of the hybrid financial instruments. 
The hybrid financial instrument rule applies to substitute payments and payments under a 
financial instrument to the extent those payments give rise to a D/NI outcome.210 The 
substitute payment rule apply to any type of D/NI outcome regardless of how it arises. 
 
A substitute payment may become payable if an economic owner of securities is deprived of a 
dividend or interest payment that would be expected to arise to it as economic owner of the 
asset. This may arise because the economic owner has lent the security under a repo or stock 
loan arrangement and expects the security to be transferred back at a later date, and during 
this period, an amount of interest or a dividend is paid. 
If a repo or stock loan extends over the record date (the date that determines to whom the 
dividend or interest on the underlying instrument will be paid), the registered holder (the 
transferee) of the securities on that date is entitled to the interest or dividend. Commonly, 
under the terms of the stock lending or repo arrangement, the transferee will be required to 
compensate the original transferor by means of a substitute payment. 
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There may be a chain of substitute payments, for instance if shares are lent to an intermediary, 
and then on-lent to a further party who sells into the market intending to repurchase similar 
shares in the market at a later date. 
Substitute payments are not limited to those made in stock lending and repo arrangements. 
For example, a company might enter into a contract to sell securities cum dividend (i.e. 
including the right to the dividend) but for some reason, perhaps because of a delay in 
delivery resulting from a failed trade, title to the securities might not pass until after the record 
date for the dividend or interest in question. The securities are thus delivered ex-dividend. 
Typically, the sales contract will require the vendor to make a substitute payment (which 
might be described as compensation) to the purchaser in such circumstances – thus the 
substitute payment is made in reverse by the transferor to the transferee. A failed delivery that 
gives rise to a substitute payment, whether unintended or deliberate. 211 
 
4.4.4 - Hybrid Entities 
 
 
Some arrangements exploit differences between the transparency or opacity of an entity for 
tax purposes (hybrid entities) and others involve the use of hybrid instruments, which 
generally involve a conflict in the characterization of the instrument (and hence the tax 
treatment of the payments made under it). 212 Hybrid instruments and entities can also be 
embedded in a wider arrangement or group structure to produce indirect D/NI outcomes. An 
indirect D/NI outcomes is hereby explained into details. Once taxpayers have entered into a 
hybrid mismatch arrangement between two jurisdictions without effective hybrid mismatch 
rules, it is a relatively simple matter for the effect of that mismatch to be shifted into a third 
jurisdiction (through the use of an ordinary loan, for example). 213 Therefore, in order to 
protect the integrity of the recommendations, OECD recommends that a payer jurisdiction 
deny a deduction for a payment where the payee sets the income from that payment off 
against expenditure under a separate hybrid mismatch arrangement. 214 
 
                                                 
211 HMRC International Manual, “Hybrid and Other Mismatches”, GOV.UK, 21 May 2019. 
 
212 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Sharing Project, “Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch 
Arrangements” Action 2, 2015 Final Report. 
 
213 HMRC International Manual, “Hybrid and Other Mismatches”, GOV.UK, 21 May 2019. 
 
214 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Sharing Project, “Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch 
Arrangements” Action 2, 2015 Final Report. 
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In most cases, the causal connection between the hybrid element and the mismatch will be 
obvious. 215 There are some challenges, however, in identifying the hybrid element in the 
context of hybrid financial instruments. Because of the wide variety of financial instruments 
and the different ways jurisdictions tax them, it has proven impossible, in practice, for OECD 
Action 2, to comprehensively identify and accurately define all those situations where cross-
border conflicts in the characterization of a payment under a financing instrument may lead to 
a mismatch in tax treatment. 216 Rather than targeting these technical differences, the focus of 
the OECD report Action 2 is on aligning the treatment of cross-border payments under a 
financial instrument so that amounts that are treated as a financing expense by the issuer’s 
jurisdiction are treated as ordinary income in the holder’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, OECD 
recommends that a financial instrument should be treated as hybrid if a payment under the 
instrument gives rise to a mismatch in tax outcomes and the mismatch can be attributed to the 
terms of the instrument. 217 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 - Hybrid Financial Instruments Rule  
 
 
                                                 
215 OECD, “Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements”, Action 2, 2014 Interim Report. 
 
216 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Sharing Project, “Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch 
Arrangements” Action 2, 2015 Final Report. 
 
217 Ibidem. 
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The OECD give, therefore, recommendations regarding hybrid financial instruments with the 
“Hybrid Financial Instrument Rule”. The main goal is to neutralize the effects of mismatches 
that arise under hybrid financial instruments through the adoption of a linking rule that would 
seek to align the tax outcomes for the payer and payee under financial instruments. This rule 
only applies to a payment made to a related person or where the payment is made under a 
structured arrangement and the taxpayer is party to that structured arrangements.  
 
In addition to the specific recommendations that we are going to highlight, the OECD Action 
2 report sets out recommendations for hybrid mismatch rules that adjust the tax outcomes 
under a hybrid mismatch arrangement in one jurisdiction in order to align them with the tax 
outcomes in the other jurisdiction. These recommendations target payments under a hybrid 
mismatch arrangement that give rise to one of the three following outcomes: 
1) Payments that give rise to a deduction/no inclusion outcome (D/NI outcome), i.e. 
payments that are deductible under the rules of the payer jurisdiction and are not 
included in the ordinary income of the payee.  
2) Payments that give rise to a double deduction outcome (DD outcome), i.e. payments 
that give rise to two deductions in respect of the same payment.  
3) Payments that give rise to an indirect D/NI outcome, i.e. payments that are deductible 
under the rules of the payer jurisdiction and that are set-off by the payee against a 
deduction under a hybrid mismatch arrangement. 218 
 
There are several recommendations in the OECD document, but the first one regards the 
hybrid financial instrument rule. These set of recommendations have the scope of avoid the 
events of hybrid mismatches.  
The first recommendation (1) explain how to neutralize the mismatch to the extent the 
payment gives rise to a D/NI outcome. 
This rule should apply to a payment under a financial instrument that result in a hybrid 
mismatch and to a substitute payment under an arrangement to transfer a financial instrument: 
a) The payer jurisdiction will deny a deduction for such payment to the extent it gives 
rise to a D/NI outcome. 219 
                                                 
218 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Sharing Project, “Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch 
Arrangements” Action 2, 2015 Final Report. 
 
219 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Sharing Project, “Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch 
Arrangements” Action 2, 2015 Final Report. 
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b) If the payer jurisdiction does not neutralize the mismatch then the payee jurisdiction 
will require such payment to be included in ordinary income to the extent the payment 
gives rise to a D/NI outcome. 
c) Differences in the timing of the recognition of payments will not be treated as giving 
rise to a D/NI outcome for a payment made under financial instruments, provided the 
taxpayer can establish to the satisfaction of tax authority that the payment will be 
included as ordinary income within a reasonable period of time. 
As a recommendation, a definition (2) of financial instrument and substitute payment has 
been given and for the purpose of the hybrid financial instrument rule: 
a) a financial instruments means any arrangement that is taxed under the rules for taxing 
debt, equity or derivatives under the laws of both the payee and payer jurisdictions and 
includes a hybrid transfer; 
b) a hybrid transfer includes any arrangements to transfer a financial instruments entered 
into by a taxpayer with another person where: 
i. the taxpayer is the owner of the transferred asset and the rights of the 
counterparty in respect of that asset are treated as obligations of the taxpayer; 
ii. under the laws of the counterparty jurisdiction, the counterparty is the owner of 
the transferred asset and the rights of the taxpayer in respect of that asset are 
treated as obligations of the counterparty. 
Ownership of an asset for these purposes includes any rules that result in the taxpayer 
being taxed as the owner of the corresponding cash flows from the asset. 
c) A jurisdiction should treat any arrangement where one person provides a money to 
another in consideration for a financing or equity return as a financial instrument to 
the extent of such financing or equity return. 
d) Any payment under an arrangement that is not treated as a financial instrument under 
the laws of the counterparty jurisdiction shall be treated as giving rise to a mismatch 
only to the extent the payment constitutes a financing or equity return. 220 
e) A substitute payment is any payment, made under an arrangement to transfer a 
financial instrument, to the extent it includes, or is payment of an amount representing, 
a financing or equity return on the underlying financial instrument where the payment 
or return would: 
- not have been included in ordinary income of the payer; 
- have been included in ordinary income of the payee; or 
                                                 
220 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Sharing Project, “Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch 
Arrangements” Action 2, 2015 Final Report, Recommendation 1.1. 
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- have given rise to hybrid mismatches; 
if it had been directly made under the financial instruments. 221 
The mentioned hybrid financial instruments rule only applies to a payment under a financial 
instrument that results in a hybrid mismatches. A payment under a financial instrument results 
in a hybrid mismatch where the mismatch can be attributed to the terms of the instrument. 222 
A payment cannot be attributes to the terms of the instrument if the mismatch is solely 
attributable to the status of the taxpayer or the circumstances in which the instrument is held. 
223 
There are however some exceptions of this rules. The primary response in the first 
recommendation 1) a) should not apply to a payment by an investment vehicle that is subject 
to special regulation and tax treatment under the laws of the establishment jurisdiction in 
circumstances where: 
a) the tax policy of the establishment jurisdiction is to preserve the deduction for the 
payment under the financial instrument to ensure that: 
- the taxpayer is subject to no or minimal taxation on its investment income;  
- those holders of financial instruments issued by the taxpayer are subject to tax 
on that payment as ordinary income on a current basis. 
b) the regulatory and tax framework in the establishment jurisdiction has the effect that 
the financial instruments issued by the investment vehicle will result in all or 
substantially all of the taxpayer’s investment income being paid and distributed to the 
holders of those financial instruments within a reasonable period of time after that 
income was derived or received by the taxpayer; 
c) the tax policy of the establishment jurisdiction is that the full amount of the payment 
is: 
- included in the ordinary income of any person that is a payee in the 
establishment jurisdiction;  
- not excluded from the ordinary income of any person that is a payee under the 
laws of the payee jurisdiction under a treaty between the establishment 
jurisdiction and the payee jurisdiction. 
                                                 
221 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Sharing Project, “Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch 
Arrangements” Action 2, 2015 Final Report, Recommendation 1.2. 
 
222 HM Treasury, HM Revenue&Customs. (2014).Tackling aggressive tax planning implementing the agreed 
G20 OECD approach for addressing hybrid mismatch arrangements. HM Treasury, HM Revenue&Customs, 
UK. 
 
223 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Sharing Project, “Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch 
Arrangements” Action 2, 2015 Final Report, Recommendation 1.3. 
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d) The payment is not made under a structured arrangement. 224 
 
The reason behind this first recommendation is to prevent a taxpayer from entering into 
structured arrangements or arrangements with a related party that exploit differences in the tax 
treatment of a financial instrument to produce a D/NI outcome. The rule aligns the tax 
treatment of payments under a financial instrument by adjusting the amount of deductions 
allowed under the laws of the payer jurisdiction, or the amount of income to be included in 
the payee jurisdiction, as appropriate, in order to eliminate the mismatch in tax outcomes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
6 - Hybrid Mismatches in Italian Jurisdiction 
 
 
The OECD reports 2015 and 2017 on Action 2, have set many innovations to contrast hybrid 
mismatches, but because of the celerity that the EU Directive has taken this innovations, not 
                                                 
224 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Sharing Project, “Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch 
Arrangements” Action 2, 2015 Final Report, Recommendation 1.5. 
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all the States in the EU have seen the proper impact of this new elements introduced by the 
BEPS Actions. 
Focusing on the Italian prospective, the new applications in terms of detecting and contrasting 
hybrid mismatches seem to have been implemented without too many difficulties.  
As cited before, when discussing and analyzing the Legislative Decree, the Italian legal 
system should be fighting the hybrid mismatches instruments correctly and more easily in 
comparison with other European and worldwide countries. We say “should” because not all 
the elements discussed and cited in the OECD report have been implemented and discussed in 
the Italian legal system. This is the case of substitute payments discussed in the previous 
paragraph. Nevertheless, the Italian legal system is working constantly studying these new 
instruments introduced by the OECD reports and has already commit itself to implement new 
transnational initiatives, thus reforming the domestic tax system.   
The legislator’s aim, when implementing the Italian legal system, is to pursue the capital 
export neutrality, thus the principle of non-discrimination. The real aim namely is to equalize 
the cross border fiscal effect to the Italian one. This principle is pursue through the 
fundamental assumption of our fiscal system which is the taxation of all products and entities 
of income produced everywhere (worldwide criteria), together with the tax credit method for 
income produced abroad if some conditions are met. The settings we have just seen is clearly 
more protective compared to the method of the exemption, with the aim of stopping the 
evasions born from hybrid mismatches, since in almost every case the foreign income it is 
subject however to taxation at least in the Italian State and the taxpayer will have to work to 
obtain the tax credit incurred cross-border. This, however, does not mean a fully protection: 
mismatches could arise through custom-made tax credit or because of different cross-border 
fiscal tax system. 
Regarding hybrid mismatches in particular, an evident index of protection is given by the 
article 44, paragraph 2, let. a) of the TUIR, 225 which says that income from equity 
investment, financial instruments and securities issued by the foreign companies, if the 
remuneration depends completely from the investment in the economic results of the issuing 
companies belonging to the same group and only if the remuneration does not refer to a 
                                                 
225 Art. 44, comma 2, lett. a) «Ai fini delle imposte sui redditi: a) si considerano similari alle azioni, i titoli e gli 
strumenti finanziari emessi da società ed enti di cui all'articolo 73, comma 1, lettere a), b) e d), la cui 
remunerazione è costituita totalmente dalla partecipazione ai risultati economici della società emittente o di altre 
società appartenenti allo stesso gruppo o dell'affare in relazione al quale i titoli e gli strumenti finanziari sono 
stati emessi. Le partecipazioni al capitale o al patrimonio, nonché i titoli e gli strumenti finanziari di cui al 
periodo precedente emessi da società ed enti di cui all'articolo 73, comma 1, lettera d), si considerano similari 
alle azioni a condizione che la relativa remunerazione sia totalmente indeducibile nella determinazione del 
reddito nello Stato estero di residenza del soggetto emittente; a tale fine l'indeducibilità deve risultare da una 
dichiarazione dell'emittente stesso o da altri elementi certi e precisi» 
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deduction in the state of the issuer, tested with a declaration of the issue itself or by certain 
and precise elements. 
 
6.1 - Hybrid Mismatch: Emilia Romagna Case 
 
 
There has been a case of hybrid mismatches, precisely a case of hybrid financial instruments, 
in the Emilia Romagna region in Italy. 226 In this occasion, the Italian tax system was able to 
analyze and detect a case of hybrid mismatch even if the rule and the indications in the Italian 
financial system are not fully detailed and understood. 
The judgement concerns a case of an Italian company that had received the right to use the 
trademark of its American parent company, first in free concession, then based on one 
usufruct (for 5 years) and then again through a license contract. The Italian had subsequently 
licensed this distinctive sign to other companies of the same group, obtaining royalties. Thus, 
the resident subsidiary had first deducted the resulting costs from the usufruct and then the 
royalties paid to the parent company with significant consequences on income taxable for 
IRES purposes. What did not appear clear to the revenue agency was the variation of a 
management model over the years without apparent economic motivation. The deductions, 
according to the Italian tax system, made by the Italian subsidiary, lacked any inherent reason 
of the fact that, in previous years, the mark had been granted free of charge and, therefore, the 
group's contractual policy was exclusively aimed at eroding the taxable income in Italy and to 
transfer profits to another tax jurisdiction. The change in industrial strategy, according to the 
Italian Revenue Agency, was nothing more than an artificial allocation of an instrument from 
one Country to the other. 
 
 
 
7 - Substitute Payments: OECD and ATAD 2 
 
 
The hybrid financial instruments rule described in the OECD Action 2, 2015 and 2017 raise 
concern on the application of a particular instrument cited earlier in the thesis. In the 2015 and 
2017 BEPS report, substitute payments instruments were studied and included in the Actions, 
                                                 
226 V. Commissione tributaria regionale dell’Emilia Romagna del 30 ottobre 2017, n. 2996 (Sez. IX); 
Commissione tributaria regionale dell’Emilia Romagna del 15 novembre 2017, n. 3092 (Sez. IX). 
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but their meaning and power were not fully understood by the actors in play. In fact, this may 
be one of the reason why these substitute payments were not incorporated in the last Council 
Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017. The job of this chapter will be analyzing the 
substitute payments under the European and Italian jurisdiction and compare them with 
substitute payments in a cross-border jurisdiction outside European Union. I will then try to 
give a brief explanation on why these instruments were not included in the ATAD 2 Directive 
and included instead in the OECD reports.  
 
7.1 - Substitute Payment in Italy and in the EU Jurisdiction 
 
 
The real question to ask is the following. Why this crucial financial instrument capable of 
contrasting the hybrid mismatches is not present in the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive? Why 
the European legislators have decided not to include these instruments?  
 
In the OECD reports, substitute payments are defined as the “last chance” to contrast hybrid 
mismatches. The substitute payments are instruments used for the closing procedure. Their 
scope is to grant the integrity of anti-hybrid rule on hybrid financial instruments. Usually a 
company utilize substitute payments when the first two instruments given in the hybrid 
financial instruments rule, hybrid financial instruments and hybrid transfer, are not successful 
in treating and avoiding hybrid mismatches. This is clear in the OECD reports (2015 and 
2017), but it seems not in the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive.  
What are the possible reason why this powerful instrument is not present in the ATAD? It 
could be difficult to explain the exact reason, because we cannot put ourselves in the shoes of 
the legislators who implemented the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive. We can however list and 
analyze some reasons, based on the difference between the OECD reports and the EU 
legislation directive. 
For instance, since substitute payments are used mostly outside the European Union such as 
in Australia, New Zealand and USA it is probably too complicated to adapt to the EU model, 
for now, either because it is too difficult to implement in the European “environment”, either 
because the European Union is not ready for this kind of new instrument.  
Another reason worth bring to light is that the legislators, who implemented the Anti-Tax 
Avoidance Directive, did not fully understand the usage of this instrument in the EU directive.  
Worldwide taxation rules are quite different from each other; this means that, to implement a 
complete new rule and a new instrument in the European Union, there must be a whole study 
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behind the innovative instruments. Differences of treatment between European Union and 
Extra European Union it is certainly a concrete reason why the EU Directive did not take into 
consideration the substitute payment as indicator to detect and stem hybrid mismatches.  
The OECD gave a definition of these instruments, but, compared to the other hybrid 
instruments listed in both Action 2 2015 and 2017, i.e. hybrid financial instruments and 
hybrid transfer, there are too few examples to permit the comprehension. To allow a financial 
instrument to be implemented into a worldwide and/or European Directive, clarification must 
be a critical and a focal point to consider. This is also to be considered as reason why 
substitute payments are not in the directive.  
The reason to adopt this new discipline in the European Union and therefore also in Italy, 
could have a more political or of international taxation instead of an actual need. Given the 
need of integration and fiscal cooperation that are critical to avoid the huge loss of resources, 
the use of a common language and the externalization of the manifest intention of an 
adjustment to international standards by our country can have an attractive function for the 
investor, the tax legal systems and States in general. Can also have a defensive function with 
respect to the creation of structure based on aggressive tax planning, for this reason it should 
be pointless to adopt different instruments based on different tax legal system (i.e. substitute 
payments), and to prevent one or more countries to use and benefit from this.  
Among the possible reasons that can lead to avoiding this last problem, there is a 
consideration of the global scope of the project, and the fact that, based on the structure of the 
devised norms, articulated therefore in primary and secondary/defensive rules (defined 
precisely “linking rules”), also if there were no cooperation from certain States, it should be 
the implementing jurisdiction to resolve the issue of tax avoidance or "mitigation" of its 
amount. 
The real question to ask is how the Italian jurisdiction can homologate to the OECD reports 
and have the same elements and instruments adopted in the tax legal system. There can be two 
scenarios. 
The first one can be a new specific regulation, created ad hoc, in order to reach out the 
European Directive article 9. That can be a single paragraph added in the Directive or in the 
TUIR (Art. 44, TUIR). This one can also be the riskier one, because the legislator could put at 
risk and damage the actual Italian legal system caused by the amendment of the article. The 
second scenario is constituted by the “reasoned” implementation of the precise and only 
provisions that would be able to intercept all of those cases from which out tax legal system 
does not provide adequate protection.   
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To support this thesis it is now ongoing new additional studies on different elements, 
including the substitute payment discipline, that are going to update the European directive in 
the following months.  
 
7.2 - Substitute Payments Cross-Border in OECD Report 
 
 
In the previous chapters, we gave a brief description on substitute payments, taken by the 
OECD Report, and now we are going more into details and the aim will be to analyze these 
instruments through examples. 
To increase the comprehension of these financial instruments it is crucial to give several 
examples with consequent analysis of the case. 
Example 1.30, Example 1.35, and Example 1.36 explain the application of the hybrid 
financial instrument rule to substitute payments. In Example 1.30, the hybrid financial 
instrument rule is applied to a purchase price adjustment under a share sale agreement where 
differences between the tax treatment of dividends and sale consideration in the 
payee/transferor jurisdiction allow the payee/transferor to substitute what would otherwise 
have been a taxable dividend for a non-taxable exchange gain. 
Example 1.35 illustrates how the substitute payment definition prevents a payer/transferee 
manufacturing a deduction for a payment under an asset transfer agreement when the 
transferee has no economic loss.  
Example 1.36 describes a situation where the transfer of a financial instrument takes the 
instrument outside the scope of the hybrid financial instrument rule. In that example the 
substitute payment definition will apply to adjust the tax consequences for the parties to the 
transfer to neutralize any mismatch in tax outcomes. 
 
The first example regards the purchase price adjustment for retained earnings. 227 
In the example illustrated in the figure below, A Co (a company resident in Country A) 
transfers shares in C Co, a wholly-owned subsidiary resident in Country C, to B Co, a 
company resident in Country B, under a share sale agreement. B Co pays fair market value for 
the shares. While the share transfer occurs on the same day as the payment, the sale takes 
place partway through C Co’s accounting period.  
A Co is entitled to an adjustment to the purchase price. The amount of the adjustment will be 
calculated by reference to the operating income of C Co at the end of the accounting period. 
                                                 
227 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Action 2, 2015 Report, Ex 1.30; 
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This adjustment is treated as a deductible expense under Country B law while A Co treats the 
payment as consideration from the disposal of a capital asset and subject to tax at preferential 
rates. 
 
 
Now the question that arise from these examples is: does the adjustment (substitute) payment 
fall within the scope of the hybrid financial instrument rule? 
The hybrid financial instrument rule should be applied in Country B to deny a deduction for 
the payment if the payment is made under a structured arrangement. While the hybrid 
financial instrument rule will not generally apply in Country A (because A Co does not treat 
the payment as made under a financial instrument), the payment constitutes the payment of an 
equity return on the transferred shares that could be subject to adjustment under the substitute 
payment rules.  
An analysis should now be given to explain better the choices coming from this example.   
In particular, whether the asset transfer agreement should be treated as a financial instrument 
should be determined under local law. 
The share sale contract could fall within the definition of financial instrument for the purposes 
of the hybrid financial instrument rule because it provides A Co with an equity based return. 
The report encourages countries to take reasonable endeavors to ensure that the hybrid 
mismatch rules apply to instruments that produce a financing or equity return in order to 
86 
 
ensure consistency in the application of the rules. The intention of the rules, however, is not to 
achieve harmonization in the way financial instruments are treated for tax purposes and, in 
hard cases, it should be left to local laws to determine the dividing line between financing 
instrument and other types of arrangement provided this is consistent with the overall intent of 
the rules. 
From what has just been said, it is time to mention the application of the hybrid financial 
instrument rule on Country B and the application of the substitute payment rule in Country A. 
Country B law does not treat the adjustment to the purchase price as subsumed within the 
consideration for the share sale but rather treats it as a separate deductible expense. The 
adjustment payment is in respect of an equity return under a financial instrument and should 
therefore be treated as a payment under a financial instrument under Country B law. 
The adjustment payment gives rise to a D/NI outcome because the payment has no 
independent significance under Country A law and is simply treated as a component of the 
purchase price. The payment should be treated as giving rise to a D/NI outcome regardless of 
whether A Co is required to treat consideration from a share sale as ordinary income. This 
mismatch in tax outcomes is attributable to the differences in the tax treatment of the share 
sale agreement under Country A and Country B laws and is therefore a hybrid mismatch 
subject to adjustment under the hybrid financial instrument rule in Country B. 
Where, as in this case, one country treats the arrangement as a financial instrument and the 
other does not, the adjustment made by the country applying the rule should be limited to the 
portion of the payment that is treated as giving rise to the equity return. 
Regarding the application of the substitute payment rule in Country A, A Co does not treat the 
payment as made under a financial instrument (because the entire amount payable is treated 
under Country A law as consideration for the sale of shares). 
If the hybrid financial instrument rule does not apply in Country B to neutralize the mismatch 
in tax outcomes the payment may still, however, be caught by the substitute payments rule in 
Recommendation 1.2(e). 228 Under this rule, a taxpayer that sells a financial instrument for a 
consideration that includes an amount representing an equity return on the underlying 
instrument (a substitute payment), is required to include such payment in income if the 
                                                 
228 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Action 2, 2015 Report, Recommendation 1.2(e): A 
substitute payment is any payment, made under an arrangement to transfer a financial instrument, to the extent it 
includes, or is payment of an amount representing, a financing or equity return on the underlying financial 
instrument where the payment or return would: 
i. not have been included in ordinary income of the payer; 
ii. have been included in ordinary income of the payee; or 
iii. have given rise to hybrid mismatch; 
if it had been made directly under the financial instrument. 
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substitute payment is deductible under the laws of the counterparty jurisdiction and the 
underlying equity return would have been taxable if it had been paid directly under the 
financial instrument. Therefore, in this example, if A Co would have treated a dividend from 
C Co as ordinary income, the payment would be treated as a substitute payment and subject to 
adjustment under those rules. 
 
Another way of treatment of substitute payments is highlighted in the example 1.35. We will 
explain hereafter the outcome of the example. 
In the example illustrated in the figure below, A Co, a company resident in Country A, wishes 
to borrow money from B Co, an unrelated lender resident in Country B. B Co suggests 
structuring the loan as a sale and repurchase transaction (repo) in order to provide B Co with 
security for the loan and to secure a B Co with a lower tax cost (and therefore a lower 
financing cost for the parties) under the arrangement. 
Under the repo, A Co transfers shares to B Co under an arrangement whereby A Co will 
acquire those shares at a future date for an agreed price that represents a financing return 
minus any distributions received on the B Co shares during the term of the repo. 229 
 
 
 
This type of financing arrangement can be described as a “net paying repo”. This is because B 
Co (lender under the arrangement and the temporary holder of the shares during the term of 
the repo) does not pay the dividends that it receives on the underlying shares across to A Co 
                                                 
229 OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Action 2, 2015 Report, Ex 1.31; 
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(the economic owner of the shares). Rather those dividends are retained by B Co as part of its 
overall return under the financial arrangements. 
In this example, both jurisdictions respect the legal form of the transaction (as a sale and 
repurchase of securities) so that neither jurisdiction treats the share loan as financial 
instruments for tax purposes. 
 
A simplified illustration of the tax consequences of such an arrangements is set out below: 
 
 
 
B Co is a share trader that, under Country B law, is required to include the net return from its 
trading activities in income. B Co borrows shares from A Co (a member of the same control 
group) in order to sell them “short”. 
B Co borrows the shares from A Co and sells them “short” (i.e. shares that borrower does not 
have) to an unrelated party for their market value of 1000. During the period of the share loan, 
B Co is required to pay a manufactured dividend 230 to A Co. B Co eventually buys back the 
shares for the same price and returns them to A Co to closeout the transaction. During the 
terms of the loan, A Co earns interest on the collateral. It pays both the collateral and the 
interest on that collateral back to B Co at the end of the transaction minus a fee. 
                                                 
230 MANUFACTURED DIVIDEND: A payment that is received by a securities lender for a dividend distributed 
on a loaned security. By agreement, the borrower, in securities lending, remits to the lender any dividends, 
interest, or other distributions that are paid during the time that the securities are on loan. In essence, the lender is 
not entitled to receive any dividends from the ownership while a security is on loan. However, it is usual the 
lender and the borrower agree that the borrower must pay a manufactured dividend to the lender as a 
compensation for such a loss of income. Conventionally, securities lending arrangements provide that the 
borrower must pay to the lender a manufactured dividend in lieu of any dividends distributed on the loaned 
security. https://www.investment-and-finance.net/finance/m/manufactured-dividend.html 
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Rather than treating the manufactured dividend as a separate deductible item, both A Co and 
B Co treat is as an adjustment to the cost of acquiring shares. The total return from the share 
lending transaction for A Co and B Co can be calculated as follows: 
 
 
 
B Co’s loss on the share trade is deductible under Country B law while the gain on the share 
trade is treated as an excluded return under Country A law.  
The question that arise from this example is: does the hybrid financial instrument rule apply 
to neutralize the mismatch in tax outcomes under these arrangements?  
The answer is given directly from the OECD Action 2 report which says that the 
Recommendation 1.2 (e) (see footnote 81) will apply to neutralize the mismatch in tax 
outcomes if A Co would have been required to treat the dividend paid on the underlying 
shares as ordinary income or B Co would have been exempt on the underlying dividend. 
 
It is worth analyze this example to understand deeply the meaning and the answer given by 
the OECD in the 2015 Final Report.  
On one hand, manufactured payment is not treated as a payment under a financial instrument. 
Both A and B treat the share loan as a genuine sale so that the payment is not treated, under 
either Country A or Country B law, as a payment that is subject to the local law rules for 
taxing debt, equity or derivatives. Furthermore, the asset transfer is not treated as a hybrid 
transfer subject to adjustment under the hybrid financial instrument rule. Accordingly, neither 
Country A nor Country B will apply the hybrid financial instrument rule to adjust the tax 
treatment of the payment. 
On the other hand, adjustment required to extent there is a mismatch in the tax treatment of 
the dividend and the manufactured dividend. An asset transfer arrangement such as this will 
give rise to tax policy concerns where the transfer results in the parties obtaining a better tax 
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outcome, in aggregate, than they would have obtained had the transferor received a direct 
payment of the underlying financing or equity return. If the asset transfer agreement 
effectively allows A Co to substitute what would otherwise have been a taxable dividend on 
the shares for non-taxable gain, or if B Co would have been entitled to an exemption on the 
underlying dividend than the Recommendation 1.2(e) will apply to adjust the D/NI outcome 
between the parties to prevent these type of arrangements undermining the integrity of the 
hybrid financial instrument rule.231 
 
The last example worth to analyze to better understand the effectiveness of the substitute 
payments is the 1.36 of the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, 2015 Final 
Project. The example focuses on the deduction for premium paid to acquire bond with accrued 
interest.  
In the example illustrated in the figure below, A Co (a company resident in Country A) and B 
Co (a company resident in Country B) each own 50% of the ordinary shares in C Co (a 
company resident in Country C). C Co issues a bond to B Co. The bond is treated as a debt 
instrument under the laws of Country C, but as an equity instrument (i.e. a share) under the 
laws of Country B. interest payments on the loan are deductible in Country C but treated as 
exempt dividends under Country B law. B Co subsequently transfers the bond to A Co. 
 
    
                                                 
231 EXAMPLE 1.35, OECD/G20, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, 2015 Final Report 
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The bond is issued for its principal amount of 20 million and has an interest rate of 12%, 
which is paid in two equal instalments throughout the year. A Co acquires the bond from B 
Co partway through an interest period under an ordinary contract of sale. A Co pays a 
premium of 0.8 million to acquire the bond which represent the accrued but unpaid interest on 
the bond. Under Country A law the bond premium can be deducted against interest income 
whereas, under Country B law, the premium is treated as an excluded capital gain. Below a 
table shows the tax treatment of A Co, B Co and C Co regarding the sale and purchase of the 
bond. 
 
 
 
As the table shows, the interest payment of 1.2 million gives rise to a deduction for C Co and 
income for A Co. A Co, however, is entitled to a deduction of 0.8 million for the premium 
paid on the bond. B Co does not receive any interest on the bond and treats the premium paid 
for the bond by A Co as an (exempt) gain on the disposal of an asset. In aggregate the 
arrangement gives rise to a deduction (for C Co) of 1.2 million and net income (for A Co) of 
0.4 million. 
 
As a consequence of this example, does the hybrid financial instrument rule operate to 
neutralize the mismatch in tax outcomes under these arrangements? Again, the 
Recommendation 1.2(e) comes to help us, so the premium paid for the bond is a substitute 
payment.  
The following analysis of this example will shed light on the concept of substitute payments. 
Firstly, we can say that the bond is a financial instrument but a payment of interest under the 
bond does not give rise to a mismatch in tax outcomes. While the payment of interest on the 
bond gives rise to a deduction within the scope of the hybrid financial instrument rule, the full 
amount of that payment is included in ordinary income under Country A law. Therefore, the 
payment of interest under the bond does not give rise to a mismatch in tax outcomes. 
While the purchase price premium is deductible under Country A law and not included in 
ordinary income under Country B law, this payment is not a payment under the bond, but 
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rather a payment to acquire the bond and such a payment will only give rise a mismatch in tax 
outcomes under the hybrid financial instrument rule if the contract to acquire bond is treated 
as a financial instrument or a hybrid transfer. 
Secondly, but most important outcome, from the example it emerges that the premium paid is 
a substitute payment.  
Although neither party to the arrangement treats the sale contract as a financial instrument, the 
consideration for the sale of the bond includes an amount representing a financing or 
equity return on the underlying financial instrument that falls within the Recommendation 
1.2(e). In this case, the premium represents the accrued financing return on the 
underlying instrument. If that financing return had been paid directly to the transferor, 
it would have given rise to a hybrid mismatch under Recommendation 1. 
Accordingly, the payment of the premium should be treated as giving rise to a mismatch that 
is subject to adjustment under the hybrid financial instrument rule. 232 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
232 EXAMPLE 1.36, OECD/G20, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, 2015 Final Report 
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8 - Conclusions 
 
 
In the light of what has been discussed in this work, we can conclude that a first new, great 
and important step has been taken towards the right direction, at least in theory, in studying 
and developing the issues related to hybrid mismatches.  
At the beginning, the first organization that started thinking of analyzing, understanding and 
then explaining hybrid mismatches was the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development with the creation of the BEPS project.  
The first draft published in 2014 of the OECD, “Neutralize the Effects of Hybrid 
Mismatches" Action 2 report, had the aim of presenting and describing the concept of hybrid 
mismatch. It took 3-4 year, for the OECD, to deliver a more complete report both in term of 
content and analyses of the possible effects and consequences of the issue. It is quite clear 
why these reports are so complex and meaningful. It is not simple to study and explain a new 
problem with proper and understandable words to country recipients; it is time consuming and 
expensive in term of resources. This also means that, at every report published by the OECD 
on the matter of hybrid mismatches, new information and solutions will be found and 
communicated to jurisdictions in different countries through documentations and 
justifications to re-elaborate their home tax directive.   
 
As far as the European Union is concern, the recent European Council Directive 2017/952 
was created just to analyze and examine hybrid mismatches. Effort has been channeled into a 
single topic because it is considered nowadays of a huge importance. More and more 
multinationals companies are exploiting such instruments that allow them to avoid taxation 
and therefore increase profits. What happen if, in the next future. Countries will not be 
competent in tackling these problems? What will happen if different countries in the European 
Union have different methods of treating financial instruments? 
 
Therefore, European Council Directive is trying to understand and treat these phenomena. 
Thanks to the great work of the pool of person who spend their time to work for the creation 
of the European Council Directive different new features of the hybrid mismatches were 
discovered. New instruments, new actors and new rules have been uncovered. This is a 
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critical work for the future. This last Council Directive is just the tip of the iceberg. In these 
days, several new drafts of a new council directive are going to be written with additions that 
will help us understand more clearly some elements only mentioned in the previous European 
Council Directive.   
Despite this great effort of the legislators in drawing up the directive and the scholars in 
studying these phenomena there are still several dark sides. 
One example of an issue not properly analyzed (the Directive only cited once) in the last 
European Council Directive 2017/952 and above all in the Italian Legislative Decree 29th 
November 2018 n.142, is the substitute payment. 
 
Substitute payment, unlike the European Council Directive and the Legislative Decree, is a 
concept well discussed and analyzed in the OECD Action 2 report; there are also examples 
reported in order to better understand the instrument. Despite the information provided in the 
supra mentioned Action 2 report, substitute payment instruments are not present in the 
European Directive. After discovering the power and the effectiveness of these instruments, 
well explained by the OCED report, I was wondering why the European Council and the 
Italian jurisdiction did not introduce in the Directive the substitute payment instrument. 
 
In the last part of the thesis, I tried to understand the reasons behind this decision from the 
European Union. 
Since I cannot identify myself with the legislator, I tried to give a personal point of view and 
possible justifications for the lack of the substitute payments. 
I started with an overview of the hybrid financial instruments in the Italian jurisdiction and 
compared them to the OECD report and the jurisdiction in which such instruments are already 
adopted. The focus on the substitute payment instruments comes in chapter 6 in which I 
describe the use of substitute payments both in the EU and Italian jurisdiction compared them 
to substitute payments in cross-border transactions outside the European Union. 
Some interesting foods for thought emerged from the discussion. It can be too complicated to 
implement in the European soil; the European Union is not ready to treat this kind of specific 
instruments; the study made by the European Union on this instruments were to insufficient to 
allow the legislator to implement this kind of hybrid instruments. 
From my humble perspective, I find interesting the thesis according to which the European 
Union and the Italian jurisdiction are not quite ready to understand and implement these 
instruments. Worldwide taxation rules are quite different from each other; this means that, to 
implement a complete new rule and a new instrument in the European Union, there must be a 
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whole study behind the innovative instruments. Differences of treatment between European 
Union and Extra European Union it is certainly a concrete reason why the EU Directive did 
not take into consideration the substitute payment as indicator to detect and stem hybrid 
mismatches.  
A serious problem could emerge. If this issue regarding substitute payments remains unsolved 
and not included in the European Directive, a warning must be set.  
If the European Union and the Italian jurisdiction are left behind and are not keeping up with 
the changes in the OECD and in other countries that have already applied the study of these 
hybrid instruments, we could be exploited for illegal purposes such as aggressive tax 
avoidance, tax reduction, profit shifting and so on. The countries that have already 
implemented this tool have obviously created limitations and barriers to block it, and 
therefore they would find an escape route in Italy and the European Union countries to bypass 
the problem. 
As a consequences, the treatment of hybrid mismatches should not be considered in the same 
way across different jurisdictions. On the basis of the principle of proportionality (mandatory 
in the European regulation), a study must be drawn up which seeks to ensure that the hybrids 
mismatches, and not only those, are treated equally between jurisdictions. For example, the 
way in which hybrids are studied and treated in Italy should be proportional to that of other 
jurisdictions. In this way there is no longer any legislative discrepancy between different 
countries. 
For this reason some instruments, described in the OECD recommendations, have not been 
considered and studied in the Italian Legislative decree and in the European directive, while 
others have been instead too much emphasized. According to the current directive, there is not 
yet a common thread that links the treatment of hybrids in the European Union. 
This is to say that, at the moment, the issue of hybrid mismatches has yet to be fully 
understood and studied in all its facets. Anyhow, as far as this problem is concern, I believe 
that solutions will be taken by the European Union and a new Council Directive will be 
published which will amend and integrate the substitute payments. 
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